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LIABILITY OF TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.
When Mr. Hitchcock addressed the American Bar Asso-
ciation in 1879, his listeners no doubt were surprised to
hear that there were at that time, in the United States,
almost o,.oo miles of telegraph lines, over which, in a
single year, very nearly 28,ooo,ooo messages had been
sent." Since that time, the telegraph industry, despite the
fierce competition of the telephone which Graham had just
invented, has developed-so rapidly that the president of the
vWestern Union Telegraph Company could report to the
stockholders of that corporation, last October; that their
company alone controlled over i,oooooo miles of line, and
that in the preceding twelve months almost 7oooo,000
messages had run over those wires, in addition to the unac-
counted number sent over private wires, leased by brokers,
press associations, etc.
From the beginning, the importance of the industry
was recognized, and ever since the first telegraph case came
before our courts, over half a century ago,
s every question
'American Bar Ass'n Reports, 93, at io5.
2 President's Report, October 14, 1903, p. 7.
"Shields v. Wash. Tel. Co., 9 West. Law J. .83, 1852.
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relating to this since frequent visitor to our forums has
been treated by our judges with the greatest earnestness
and deliberation.
And this was but "natural. No Holt or Mansfield or
Kenyon had applied his great mind to the problem of train-
ing this stranger to the common law, and to the judges of
cur generation came the responsibility of devising the
proper means of treatment. Thus obliged to act without
guide, it is but natural that unanimity of opinion should
not have resulted. But it is strange that the more con-
sistently they have been careful, the less careful they have
been to be consistent, and upon scarcely a point in the law
of telegraphs, be it of great or of little importance, is there
not a diametrical opposition of decision. Not only has the
disagreement been as to the possibility of reaching cer-
tain desired results by legal rules, but as to the desirability
of reaching those results even if that were possible by legal
rules.
The specific gravity of law is necessarily less than the
specific gravity of public policy, and in these telegraph
cases has this truth been made especially clear. Public
opinion, too, as the geographical grouping of the jurisdic-
tions shows, has played no small part in the determina-
tion of the questions which we shall have to consider. Nar-
row indeed would be that lawyer who would deny that
these factors should be given due weight. When all is over,
it will be found that they are controlling; that "law can
ask no better justification than the deepest instincts of
man,"' and that as man has a heart, so there must be a
"heart of jurisprudence."' The problem which we must
attack, therefore, is not simply "How stands it written?"
but "What does the sense of right of an average man dic-
tate?"
I. THE DUTY.
Whea a man goes to a telegraph office, and pays the
operator to send a lawful message, which the latter agrees
to send, it would seem unquestionable that the telegraph
company, which the operator represents, comes into a con-
'Holmes. The Path of the Law, io Harv. L. Rev., 457, at 477.
'Theodore Sedgwick, in io Law Reporter, 49, at 56, z847.
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tractual relation, and therefore under a contractual liabil-
ity, to the man. There is an agreement between parties
capable of contracting, by which one agrees to do a law-
fil act, on a valuable consideration paid by the other. The
agreement is to make reasonable efforts to transmit the
message with speed and accuracy, and to deliver it with
speed and accuracy. That a telegraph company is always
under a contractual liability to the sender of the message
seems clear. We shall have to consider later whether this
be the only liability of the company to the sender, and if
there be another, we shall have to decide upon which the
Eender can hold the company more beneficially, if it be
guilty of a breach of its duty.
Is the telegraph company under a contractual liability
to the person to whom the message is to be sent? The
company does not agree with the addressee himself that it
will send the message with all reasonable rapidity and cor-
rectness, and it could come into a contractual relation with
him, therefore, only through the sender, i. e., if the sender
really were contracting for the addressee. This would be
the case if the sender were the addressee's agent, or if the
sender entered into the contract with the company for the
benefit of the addressee.
From the nature of the contract itself, this relation of
principal and agent seldom would exist between the ad-
dressee and the sender of a message. In the case of com-
mercial messages, the relation is very much more fre-
quently the antagonistic one of vendee and vendor than
the co-operative one of principal and agent. In the
case of non-commercial messages, the agency rarely would
exist in advance, from the nature of things, and the rela-
tion could be created by ratification only if the sender had
purported to act for the addressee.
A person not really a principal cannot become entitled
to the rights and liable to the duties of one by ratification,
if he were undisclosed at the time that the contract was
made.6 The nature of the telegram might be held to show
that the message was sent for the benefit of the addressee,
but it scarcely would be held to show that the relation of
Maxsted & Co. v. Durant, App. Cas. igoi, 24.
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principal and agent existed between the sender and the
addresse,. In such case, then, the addressee could sue as
principal only if the sender had said that lie was acting as
the addressee's agent.
So that, although the existence of an actual agency, or,
what is equivalent, a ratification, when possible, would
place the telegraph company under a contractual liability
to the addressee,7 it seems that, as a practical matter, this
liability would seldom exist.
The right of one for whose benefit a contract has been
made, to sue upon it, is very closely analogous to the right
of a principal, and it is possible that had the English
and Massachusetts courts more considered the close re-
semblance, bearing in mind how the theory of ratification
has extended the cases in which the relation of agency is
held to exist, those courts might have allowed the so-called
"beneficiary" of a contract to sue upon it. On the gen-
erally accepted doctrine of the American state courts that
the beneficiary of a contract may sue upon it, in what cases
could the addressee of a telegram sue the telegraph com-
pany? In answering this, we must consider first the limi-
tations on the beneficiary's right.
In the first place, the beneficiary's ,ight to sue in any
case is denied in some jurisdictions.
In the second place, although we are accustomed to hear
it said that the rule in Lawrence v. Fo.r8 enables any one for
whose benefit a contract is made, to sue upon it, yet the
rule is applied much less broadly, and is accurately ex-
pressed, "When one for a valuable consideration agrees
with another 1o pay the dcbts of that othcr person to a third
person, such agreement inures to the benefit of the third
party, who may maintain an action thereon."'
What debt can the sender of a message owe to the ad-
dressee, which will be paid by sending the message? Al-
'Millikcn v. W'. U. T. Co., iio N. Y. 403, i888; Manker v. IV. U. T.
Co., 34 S. 839, Ala. I9o2; where the addressee was in fact the sender's
principal, though undisclosed at time message sent: W. U. T. Co. v.
Millsapp, 33 S. i6o, Ala. iqoz
2o N. Y. 268, x859.
'Per Brown, A. J., in Mathonican v. Scott, 87 Tex. 396, at 398, 1894-
(Italics ours.)
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though a considerable number of courts has placed the
addressee's right to sue, upon the rule of Lawrnce v. Fox,"
it seems clear that if that rule be applied with the limita-
tions placed upon it by subsequent decisions, it furnishes
in few, if any, cases an adequate explanation of the ad-
dressee's right of action."1
Despite the warning of those who most strongly advo-
cate codification, it has been regarded by many courts as a
"panacea for all the ills which afflict judicial and forensic
life,"" and an attempt has been made to extend the doc-
trine of beneficiary, in virtue of the provision, in all of the
codes which follow the New York Code, allowing the party
in actual interest to sue. Since most of the conflict has
been as to who was the person actually interested in the
contract, to hold that the code entitles the third party to
sue is to cut the Gordian knot in a way definitive rather
more than justifiable. It would seem, too, almost conclu-
sive against giving such weight to the code provision that
it was not even mentioned in Lawrencc v. Fox, which was
decided subsequently to the adoption of the code.
In this dilemma, the Texas courts have taken a far step
in advance, and one which might be upheld more easily
had it been made more consciously. For the purposes of
te'egraph litigation, the rule of Mathonican v. Scott (supra)
is disregarded entirely-indeed, we have not found a single
telegraph case in which that rule is mentioned-and the
doctrine acted upon, that "the party to be in fact accom-
modated, benefited or served, holds the beneficial interest
in the contract. We think the question as to who may
maintain a suit for damages for the breach of contract de-
pends upon who in fact was to be served, and who is dam-
aged."'" We shall consider later the results of this vague
test, but one cannot but feel at once that to treat as the
real party to a contract whoever may, as matters eventu-
"Aiken v. TV. U. T. Co., 5 S. C. 358. 1874; Russell v. W. U. T. Co.,
57 Kans. 2,30, x896; Barrack v. P. T. C. Co., 12 Ohio Dec. 78, i899.
2 i5 Harv. L. R. 143, 1901.
": Address of D. D. Field (one of the framers of the N. Y. Code)
before the Law Academy of Philadelphia, in i886.
Per Henry, A. J., in W. U. T. Co. v. Adams, 75 Tex. 53r, at 536,
x88.
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ate, be injured by its breach, is not only to apply the doc-
trine of ratification to a relation not that of principal and
agent, but to reach a conclusion faribeyond any reached
by an application of that doctrine elsewhere. And even on
the Texas rule, broad as it is, there would be many cases
where the addressee could not recover; for some messages
certainly are sent purely for the sender's benefit, and in
such case the addressee should not be allowed to sue.
If there be no agency, and if the addressee be not the
beneficiary, there can be no contractual relation between
the addressee and the company; the practical result of
which would be that the addressee rarely could sue as a
party to the contract.
Few courts outside of Texas, therefore, have rested the
addressee's right of recovery upon any contractual basis.
In England, the Court of Appeal was unable to find any
other ground of liability, and accordingly denied the ad-
dressee's right of recovery in a case where no contractual
relation could be established. 4
Since the internal telegraph lines in England are under
the control of the postmaster-general, 5 for the negligence
of whose subordinates, as in case of other public officers,
there can be no recovery," the questions which arise so
often in this country rarely require decision in England-
indeed, we have been unable to- find a case in which the
addressee has sued for negligent transmission or delivery
since 1877. It has been suggested, however, that should
the case reach the House of Lords, a different result might
be reached by that body now, than was arrived at by the
Court of Appeal twenty-five years ago."
In the United States, the courts with practical unan-
imity have sustained the addressee's right of action, but
this unanimity has been limited strictly to the conclusion
reached; the different theories on which the results have
" Dickson v. Reuter's Tel. Co., L R. 3 C. P. D. 1, 1877, following
Playford v. U. K. E. T. Go., L. P- 4 Q. B. 7o6, 1869.
231 and 32 Vict. C. 1io, x868; 32 and 33 Vict. C. 73, 1869, the "Tele-
graph Acts."
'6 Casually Co. v. Ry. Co., 17 Fed. 434, 1902; Mayne, Damages (6th
ed.). 328.
' Pollock, Torts (3d ed.), p. 496.
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been obtained have been almost as numerous as the courts
which have obtaiiied them. It is proposed to examine some
of these theories.
I. Misrepresentation.-The eminent counsel (Herschell,
Benjamin, Q. C. C. and Butler) in Dickson v. Telegraph Co.,
supra, who were suing for the careless delivery to them of
a message intended for another, upon which message the
plaintiff acted to his injury, based their claim mainly
upon Collen v. Wright.1' This case had established that a
person who, through an honest mistake, believed himself
authorized to contract as agent for another became indi-
vidually liable on the contract so made, upon. the theory
that he impliedly warranted his authority to act as agent.
The telegraph company, was the argument, in the same
way warrants that it was authorized to deliver this message
to the plaintiff; it was not authorized to deliver it to the
plaintiff at all, and is liable for this breach of its warranty of
authority. The court answered, Collen v. Wright applies
only to cases where a contract is made with the person
who supposes himself to be an authorized agent."' Here,
the claim is really that the company misrepresented a fact,
viz., the person to -ivhom the message was addressed, and
Collen v. Wright is no exception to the general rule that
"no erroneous statement is actionable unless it be inten-
tionally false"; there was carelessness, it is true, but "it is
never laid down that the exemption from liability for an
innocent misrepresentation is taken away by careless-
ness.",--
It seems to us that the court was clearly right as to the
inapplicability of Collcn v. Wright,"' but it seems to us
more doubtful whether their conclusion on the question of
misrepresentation was correct.
288 E. & B. 647, 1857.
The dealing with the supposed agent need not be intended to
eventuate in a contract: Starkey v. Bank of England, App. Cas. 1903,
114. . Per Bramwell, L J., at 6.= It scarcely would be claimed that the telegraph company would
be liable in the absence of negligence, whereas liability for breach
of implied warranty of authority exists even though there be no
negligence: Oliver v. Batik of England, i Ch. 1901, 652. The doc-
trine of Colihn v. Wright was applied without any mention- of that
case, however, in May v. W. U. T. Co., 112 Mass. 9o. 1873, which case
is, as far as we have been able to find, unique in this respect.
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Peck v. Dcrry"" had not been decided then, but if, as Lord
Bowen said, "there is not a lawyer living who has ever
heard the law laid down in an action for deceit (i. e., for
damages for fraudulent misrepresentations) except in one
way, and that is the way in which Peek v. Derry has de-
cided,"" we fairly may test Dickson v. Tel. Co. on the rule
oi Peck v. Derry to determine whether the company could
be held in deceit.
It must be premised that the company could not be held
liable on this view, in case of the non-delivery of the mes-
sage, for in such case it would have made no representa-
tion at all to the addressee, except under certain improb-
able circumstances. So even if we find that the sendee
could sue for inaccurate delivery, and possibly for late de-
livery, we should not have laid ground for the addressee's
recovery, in case of non-delivery.2 '
Peek v. Derry requires that the statement must be made
-with at least an honest belief in its truth. In a case like
Dickson v. Tel. Co., A. has given the company a message to
send to X.; the company represents that the message was
to be sent to Y. The company is not making a careless
statement of opinion; it is misrepresenting a fact which it
knows. Not only had it-i.e.,the agent who made the mis-
take originally-no grounds for supposing that the mes-
sage was intended for Y., but it had express notice that it
was intended for X. Surely the company would not be
allowed to escape liability for its misstatement by saying
that it honestly believed that A. meant the message to be
sent to Y., although he distinctly said that he wanted it
sent to X. Even under Peek v. Derry, and a fortiori in this
country, where a careless misrepresentation is not allowed
to go unpunished, we believe that a telegraph company
can be held liable in deceit for carelessness in the trans-
mission of a message.2
14 App. Cas. 337, i849.
Angus v. Clifford, 2 Ch. D. 1891, 449, at 470.
"We use sendee to mean one to whom message is delivered by the
company, whether late or inaccurately; and addressee to mean one to
whom message is not delivered by the company at all.
Dictum in Russl v. IV. U. ' . Co., 57 Kans. 23o, i896.
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But, as we have seen, this would leave the addressee un-
protected,, and it would be difficult to allow recovery by
the sendee where the message was delivered correctly, but
late.
2. Malfeasance as Agent.-The most important early
case in this country in which the sendee sued was the Dry-
burg case.2' There the message had been inaccurately de-
livered, and the sendee, acting on the inaccurate message,
had suffered a loss. The plaintiff claimed that the tele-
graph company was the sender's agent, and that, like any
other agent, it was liable to any one injured by its misfeas-
ance. The lower court (per Sharswood, P. J.,) rejected this
contention, but the Supreme Court reversed its decision,
saying (per Woodward, J.,) "I am inclined to think the
company ought to be regarded as the common agent of
the parties at either end of the wire. But, however this
may be, regarding the company as alone the agent of the
sender of the message, is it to be doubted that the agent is
liable for misfeasance, even to third parties? For non-feas-
ance, I agree, the agent is responsible only to his employer,
because there is no privity of consideration, betwixt the
agent and a third party.'' a
Of this view, as of the previous one, it must be premised
that it would allow recovery only in cases where there was
ar. inaccurate delivery. It certainly would not permit the
addressee to iecover,"T and it seems very doubtful whether
a late delivery could be termed a misfeasance. But there is
another objection-the telegraph company is not an
agent; it is an independent contractor, if ever there was
one. Of agency, it is said "that the agent shall, for the time
being, put his own will under the direction of another, is
one of the primary elements in the relation.""8  Does the
telegraph company put its will under the sender's direc-
tion? Can he in any way control the mode of performance
of the contract, or is his right limited to the fact of per-
formance? When we consider the definition of an inde-
N. Y. & WVash. Prig. Tel. Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa. 298, x86o.
"a At 303.
Wharton, Contracts, 791.
Mechem, Agency, § 473.
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pendent employment, it appears reasonably clear that a
telegraph company is, in the delivery of a message, an inde-
pendent contractor;2 ' for he represents "the will of his em-
ployer only as to the result of his work, and not as to the
means by which it is accompl'shed.""
However, even admitting that the company is an agent,
our problem is defined merely, and in no way solved. An
agent is liable to one injured by his malfeasance only in
certain cases, viz., where he owes the person injured a
duty of care, and this brings us in another -way to a third
view of the nature of the telegraph company's liability to
the addressee of a message; that it is based on negli-
gence."1
3. Negligcnc.-There are probably few more inclusive
terms in our law than negligence, and accurately to define
the word in concrete terms seems to us almost impossible.
It is the breach of a duty of care; but this does not help us.
In what circumstances does this duty of care exist? We
can arrive at a more satisfactory answer to this question,
perhaps, by considering what legal duties a man has, or,
which is a correlative statement, what legal rights a man
has.
We may divide a man's rights roughly into two classes:
(I) His rights that other men shall not do or omit to do
certain acts in any event, and (2) his rights that other men
shall not do or omit to do certain acts, if their perform-
ance or omission is likely to injure him. This first class of
rights we call absolute, and the second class we call rela-
tive. Of these absolute rights the most important is that
of having those who contract with us fulfill their contracts.
Bigelow, L. C., on Torts, 625, 1875; Joyce, Electric Law, § 9o7,
xgoo; Pepper v. IV. U. T. Co., 87 Tenn. 554, 1889; Shingleur v. W. U. T.
Co., 72 Miss. io3o, i895; P. T. C. Co. v. Shoefer, 23 Ky. Law. Rep. 344,
igo. It was held that the company is the sender's agent: Gennain
Fruit Co. v. W. U. T. Co., 7o Pac. 6s8, Cal. 19o2 (dictum).
"Mechem, Agency, § 777.
' Bigelow, L. C., on Torts, 626, 1875; Ferrero v. W. U. T. Co., 9 App.
D. C. 455, 1896. Wharton seems to hold the same opinion, for he
bases the liability of the company on the duty, "Sic uere luo ut non
alienumn lwdas (Negligence, § 764)"; which is one form of expressing
the law of negligence. It is suggested that if the English courts had
treated the question of liability in- deceit as a question of negligence,
Peek v. Derry would not have been decided as it was.
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It is well settled that breach of contract is actionable
whether it result in pecuniary loss or not."
Of the relative rights there are two kinds, those in which
damage is presumed, such as trespass, and those in which
damage must be proved. For practical purposes, these
relative rights, in which damage is presumed are no differ-
ent from absolute rights" and the two are often confused,
but the distinction between them is brought out clearly in
Pigott's admirable discussion:' "In all cases of. trespass,
damage is presumed. . . . It is not difficult to account
for this, because it is impossible to say even from the mere
act of walking on a man's land that no damage can pos-
sibly have accrued; and if it does not take the form of dam-
age by injury to the grass, it may take the form of
' Broom, Common Law (9th ed.), 72. It would be most interesting
to discover the origin and trace the development of this doctrine by
which a man who has suffered no pecuniary loss, and has no future
rights to protecta should be allowed to recover nominal damages in
apparent forgetfulness of the court's repugnance to litigation. One
would think at first that here was a most appropriate place for the
application of the maximum dc ininins non curat lex; and yet, although
the failure to award nominal damages is not reversible error when
such recovery does not carry costs, we have found but a single case
in which the court denied the right of a person who had suffered no
pecuniary loss from the breach of a contract to recover nominal dam-
ages.b The damages, we scarcely can suppose, are punitive. Mr.
Markby has suggested that it is inconsistent to hold the breach of a
contract to be the infringement oi an absolute right, and defamation
to be the breach of a relative rightc and it may be that breach of
contract is the breach of a relative right, damage being presumed as
in the case of many other relative rights, such as trespass. On this
view Mayne's classification of breach of contract and of trespass to-
getherd would be correct, but they shorld then both be classed, not as
absolute, but as relative rights. The conclusion is rather startling-
that on our definition of absolute rights, this time-honored term is
nothing but a name.
"Jenks, Law Quarterly, January, i9o3, p. 2o.
' Law of Torts, x2'_ to 144.
a Of course, where the contract requires continuous acts, nominal
damages will be awarded to vindicate the right to performance of the
future acts. In such case, an injunction even will be granted: Dickinson
v. Canal Co., 15 Beav. 26o, 1852; just as trespass, not injurious in itsclf,
will be restrained to prevent the acquisition of an easement: Walker v.
Emerson. 89 Cal. 456. i8qi. But this is obviously a different case from
thoqe where the contract is for but one act, and as to which the plain-
tiff has no future interest.
b llcbcr v. M1fining Co., 16 Cape L. J. 128, -W. South African Repub-
lic. This case may have been influenced by the eccentiicities of the
local law.
c Elements of Law. 699, note i.
d Damages (6th ed.), 6.
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depriving him of the charge for coming on the ground,
which he was otherwise entitled to make."'" But in some
cases damage must be really proved, i.e., the act or omis-
sion complained of must be shown to have caused damage
to a legal right.
This is true in all actions on the case; and negligence is
an action in the case. The conclusion would be that care-
lcssness becomes a legal wrong, i. e., negligence, only when
it causes what the law regards as damage.""
Now,when a telegraph companydelivers a message care-
lessly, what actual damage does it cause? Evidently if the
message be commercial, it causes pecuniary loss, and the
law always has said that a man is under a duty to avoid the
infliction on another of pecuniaryloss, through the former's
carelessness, if such loss reasonably should have been fore-
scen as likely to follow the carelessness. But suppose that
the message be social, and that the only consequence of
its careless delivery reasonably to be foreseen is a senti-
mental injury. Is a man bound so to act as not to cause
sentimental injury to another? Or, in other words, has a
man a legal right to "mental tranquillity"?"8 There is, of
course, but one way of discovering what legal rights a man
has, and that is by seeing what interests the law has pro-
tected. We do not believe that the law has protected a
man's interest in the peaceful state of his mind, and we do
not think, therefore, that a telegraph company is bound, on
any principle of negligence, so to act as to avoid causing
sentimental dis-ease. We shall consider later the very im-
portant distinction between the questions whether the in-
fliction of mental anguish constitutes a legal injury, and
whether when there is a legal injury and it causes mental
anguish, the mental anguish is an element of damage."
'At 143.
"a Of course, the tendency of the act to cause the legal injury must
exist also, so that a reasonsble man would foresee the probability of
legal injury, but with this question of fact we are not concerned here.
" Hale, Damages, § 39.
'* "There is a material distinction between damages and injury. . ..
The word 'injury' denotes the illegal act, the term 'damages' means the
sum recoverable as amends for the wrong." Vcrnon v. Voeglcr, xo3
Ind. 314, 318, 319, x885.
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Ve conclude, then, that while the telegraph company
oftcn might be held liable to the addressee of a'comner-
cial message, it could not so be to the addressee of a
non-commercial message, and that if the company be held
liable on ordinary principles of negligence, recovery by the
addressee will not be possible in all cases.
35 *
4. Itsurrs.-It has been suggested 8 that telegraph
companies should be held liable, at least in England, by
analogy to Rylands v. Fletcher,"' as insurers against injury
from the use of their ultra-dangerous commodity. The
Privy Council has held that electricity is a dangerous arti-
cle, and that one who uses it is an insurer under Rylands v.
Fletcher,"0 but of course, when a message is delivered late
or inaccurately, the plaintiff does not complain of the elec-
tricity itself, nor does his pecuniary loss or mental anguish
become either greater or less because contact with a
heavily charged wire would cause instant death. Besides
which, if anything is well settled in electric law, it is that
telegraph companies are not insurers of the prompt and
proper delivery of messages intrusted to them.
5. Ditty as Public Agcnt.-None of the above-suggested
grounds of liability is, it is submitted, the true explana-
tion of the addressee's right of action, and the most careful
opinions have recognized that, were a telegraph company
a mere private corporation, transacting a business of little
importance to the public, there would be no solid legal
principle upon which the addressee could sue in every
case.' The public importance of telegraph companies is,
we believe, the basis of their duty to deliver promptly and
properly every message intrusted to them. Mr. Chief Jjus-
tice Waite said in M1Iuin v. Illinois,"2 a case which, although
"a Mr. C. J. Waite estimated that more than So per cent. of the mes-
sages sent are commercial: Pensacola Tel. Co. v. IV. U. T. Co., 96
U. S. x, at 9, 1877. We have not been able to secure later statistics, but
doubt whether the proportion has changed much.
=Merriam, Negligence of Telegraph Companies, 6 South. L. Rev.,
N. S., 321, at 344, note 3, x88o.
L R. 3, H. L 330, i868.
English and S. A. Tel. Co. v. Cape Town Tramway Co., App. Cas.
1902, 38.
"W. U. T. Co. v. Al.en, 66 Miss. 549, 1889.
094 U. S. i3, at i26, 1876.
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frequently criticised, is still undoubted law in our Supreme
Court, 3 that Lord Hale, more than two hundred years
before, had settled the principle that "when private prop-
erty is 'affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris
privati only.'" In other words, when property is dedi-
cated to the use of the public, the public has an interest
in seeing that the purpose of the dedication is carried out.
We must consider whether a telegraph company does
devote its property to the use of the public, and if so, the
extent of the public interest in that use.
Fortunately, we need not consider the vexed question of
what constitutes a public use;" for, "in the present state of
civilization, it would be idle to assert that a telegraph com-
pany is not charged with a public function. The telegraph
company in this case does not so assert."' 5 So clearly has
the depth of the public interest in telegraph companies
been recognized, that abroad they generally are adminis-
tered by the government itself, and we know that national
ownership of telegraph lines in this country has been urged
not infrequently.
What is the extent of the public interest in that use?
The most obvious interest of the public is that the public
shall be entitled to use the property, and it is from this fact
that the courts have laid down the rule, without hesitation,
that every individual has a right to demand that the com-
pany serve him with as great care and faithfulness as, and
at a no higher price than, it serves any other individual.",
But the public clearly has an interest beyond the service
" Coiling v. Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S. 79, igor.
"See i Lewis, Eminent Domain, i65. If we may be so bold as to
criticise his definition of a public use, we should question whether the
right of every member of the community to use the property was not
rather the consequence than the proof of the fact that the use was
public. For interesting discussions of the question as to what consti-
tutes a public use, see Matter of Renville, 46 App. Div. N. Y. 37, 1899,
where the quotations of the New York Stock Exchange were held not
to be affected with a public interest, and Inter Ocean Pub. Co. v. Asso-
ciatcd Press, 184 Ill. 438, lToo, where a contrary conclusion was reached
concerning the franchise of the Associated Press.
" Per Irvine, C., in IV. U. T. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 44 Neb. 326, at
336, 337, x895.
"State ex rel. v. Dcl. and Atlantic Tel. CO., 47 Fed. 663. i8gi; State
ex rel. v. Tel. Co., 61 S. C. 83, Igoi; State v. Tel. Co., 93 Mo. App. 349,
I9oZ
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of every individual with equal care and for the same price.
It has an interest that this equal care be reasonably great
and that this same price be reasonably low. In both cases,
reasonableness is a question of fact: reasonableness of care
is for the jury; reasonableness of price, for the legislature.'
But the interest of the public is equal in both cases. If,
then, a telegraph company refuses to serve X. at such price
as the legislature has declared reasonable, or with such
care as a jury considers reasonable, it Is guilty of a
breach of its duty to the public. Every person in the com-
munity has a right to demand that a telegraph company
transmit and deliver with reasonable speed and skill every
message intrusted to it, and a failure of the company so to
do is a legal wrong, an injuria, to every member of the pub-
lic; and this, it seems to us, entirely irrespective of any
statute requiring prompt and accurate transmission.
Many have been the arguments as to whether our law
recognizes the condition of injuria sine daninum; the phrase
meaning, we suppose, the violation of a legal right, not
resulting in legal damage. It has been asserted that such
a condition is possible, and that, like dainnurn sine injuria,
it is not actionable.'8 Another authority maintains that it
is actionable;"' and a third asserts that the phrase is mean-
ingless." We should be inclined to agree with this last
view, for it seems to us that the violation of a legal right
is, in itself, damage in the eye of the law--actual damage,
if you will, for, we take it, actual damage means nothing
more than damage which is. It is, however, immaterial
whether we say that injuria involves danum, and that
both are essential to a cause of action, or that injuria does
n'ot involve damninon, and that injuria alone is requisite for
a cause of action. In either view it would seem that if the
failure of a telegraph company quickly and carefully to
A'cb. Tclephone Co. v. S!ate, 55 Neb. 627, z898.
"Weeks, Daninun absque izjuria, § 5; unless Weeks understands by
the phrase a legal wrong to A., causing damage to B., in which case
it would seem almost axiomatic that B. could not sue-he has not
suffered any injuria.
" Broom, Common Law (gth ed.), 82o; Wcbb v. Mfg. CO., 3 Sumner,
189, 1838, per Story, J.
'Watson, Personal Injuries, § 9.
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deliver a message be an injuria to every member of the
community, every member should be allowed to sue-
which, of course, he is not. What is the reason for this?
Let us consider a public nuisance. It is well settled that
"the plaintiff cannot champion the cause of the public, and
have it abated or restrained, unless it can show a special
particular injury resulting from said nuisance to itself or
its property, peculiar and distinct from the injury and dam-
age which the public in general suffers from said nuis-
ance. ' "* This is not because every member of the public
is not injured by the public nuisance; it is because the
injury to each member is so small that it could be com-
pensated by nominal damages, and the recovery of nominal
damages would encourage a useless multiplicity of suits.
"The law abhors the multiplying of such suits, and has
consequently taken away from all members .of the com-
munity alike this cause of action in respect of nominal dam-
ages to which they may become entitled, and has substi-
tuted the remedy by indictment."5  This is merely the
extension to a civil wrong of the universal rule in criminal
law, that citizens sometimes must surrender their indi-
vidual rights of action to a common representative, in the
interests of convenience. But as was, long ago, the case
in criminal law too, "if the violation of the right is accom-
panied by substantial injury to any member of the com-
munity, his right of action to recover damages in respect
of it remains untouched. "' We must notice, then, that
every member of the community has a cause for action
when-there is any breach of a public duty, but that, in the
interests of policy, the right of action is given only to
those whose damage is of an appreciable amount.
The same is true, it is submitted, in the case of a breach
of public duty by the telegraph company. Every indi-
vidual suffers a legal wrong from this breach, and every
member of the community sustains an injury-viz., the
general diminished confidencein the efficiency of thispublic
" Per Toney, J., in Louisville Mfg. Co. v. Ry. Co., reported from
private print in 3 Amer. 'Flee. Cas. 236, at 265, x8go.
Piggott, Torts, 155.
n Ibid.
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agent-but of so small a pecuniary amount that he is not
allowed to recover the nominal damages which would be
compensation for the injury." But if any individual suffer,
as a not too remote consequence of this breach of duty,
special damage of a kind recognized by law, lie will be en-
titled to sue.
If cur premises be sound, we have established a right of
action in the addressee in every case where he suffers, as a
proximate consequence of the company's breach of duty,
particular damage; his- cause of action, however, being
founded, not on the damage, but on the breach of duty.
This reasoning, of course, would give the sender a similar
right of action, and the question naturally arises, what
effect will the contractual right of action which exists
always in the sender, and frequently in the addressee, have
on this delictual liability of the company? To speak of
the tort as "founded upon contract," as is done frequently
in this and, on this point, in the analogous case of a com-
mon carrier," is, we think, confusing. The tort obligation
is entirely independent of the contract obligation. True,
the plaintiff cannot recover without alleging the contract,
but that is because, in the nature of things, the duty can-
not arise until the contract is made. Until transmission is
requested there can be no duty to transmit. That the tort
liability does not depend on the existence of a contract is
evident from the fact that a refusal to contract is, except
under extraordinary circumstances," per se, a tort."1
Equally independent of, although arising cotemporane-
ously with, the contract obligation, is the public duty to
transmit with due care and speed.
Were the contract, then, unconditional, it would have no
effect at all on the right of action for breach of duty except
on the question of the charge for transmission. But as a
"It is conceived that if a telegraph company were guilty of con-
stant acts of negligence, its charter could be forfeited by the state:
2 MoraWetz on Corps., § loi8, which proves that the negligence is a
wrong to the public.
13 Serwe v. N. Pac. R. R., 48 Minn. 78, 81, 1892.
"Merriam, Negligence of Telegraph Companies, 6 South. Law Rev.,
N. S., 321, at 342, i88o.
Gray v. W. U. T. Co., 87 Ga. 350, i8gi; see the analogous case of a
gas company, Coy v. Gas Co., 146 Ind. 65s, especially at 662, 1897.
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matter of fact, telegrams always are sent subject to numer-
ous conditions, such as the stipulation that the company
will not be liable for unrepeated messages, or unless claims
are presented within sixty days, etc. It would seem mani-
festly unfair to allow a party to a contract containing such
conditions to evade their force merely by changing the
form of his action. We cannot here consider the validity
of these conditions, although firmly convinced that, even
where it is upheld, the conditions have a much greater
moral, than legal, effect. 8 But conceding them valid, it
seems clear ,,aat if the sender sued within sixty days for a
breach of duty, the sixty-day limitation of action would be
immaterial; and so, if he sued for the late delivery of a
message, it would seem evident that the clause limiting
liability for unrep,!ated messages should have no effect."'
It would seem, therefore, logical to say that the sender or
addressee could sue for breach of the public duty, and that
to this action the telegraph company could set up any
valid, relevant contract stipulations agreed to by the plain-
tiff;6 0 such stipulations-being regarded as a pro tauto waiver
of the plaintiff's right to insist on the performance by the
company of its public duty. This has been held to be
the proper procedure in an action against a common car-
rier.6
1
We have proceeded tlis far, that the sender can sue
always, and the addressee frequently, in contract; but that
that which is a breach of contract is also a breach of public
duty, and consequently, to the sender and addressee, as
well as to every other individual in the community, a legal
M4We believe that it has not been pointed out that the opinion in
Primnrose v. IV. U. T. Co., 154 U. S. I, 1894, the last case which has
held the stipulation against liability, for unrepeated messages, to fur-
nish the company immunity even against negligence, was given by the
same judge who delivered the opinion in the first important case
where a similar conclusion was reached: Grinnell v. IV. U. T. Co., 113
Mass. 299, 1873; the late Mr. Justice Gray, a lawyer of magnificent
ability, but tenacissimus propositi.
16I. U. T. Co. v. Fcnton, 52 Ind. x, 1875; TV. U. T. Co. v. Broesche,
72 Tex. 654, 1889; contra, Birkclt v. TV. U. T. Co., 1o3 Mich. 361, 1894.
" IV. U. T. Co. v. Yopst, 118 Ind. 248, x88g; Sh w v. P. T. C. Co., 79
Miss. 67o, 1902, where, although the sender sued in tort, the-action was
held to be governed by the law of the place where the contract was
made.
' Boaz v. R. R. Co., 87 Ga. 463, 189!.
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wrong, for which, however, the sender and addressee can
sue only if they suffer, as a not too remote consequence of
the wrong, peculiar damage of a kind recognized by the
law. Our next consideration must be, what i3 the test of
remoteness, and then, what elementb of damage are recog-
nized at law; in order to determine in what cases the sender
and the addressee may sue; either ex contractu or ex delicto.
II. THE LIABILITY FOR NON-PERFORMANCE OF THE
DuTy.
I. The Measure of Damages.
In the very beginningwe must notice a great distinction,
from the overlooking of which great confusion has re-
sulted, 2 between the necessary proximity of the injury and
the legal elements of recovery. Pecuniary loss is always
a legal element of recovery, and yet frequently it cannot be
compensated for, because too remote; so, it may be that
mental anguish is a proximate enough consequence of the
injury, and yet, that it cannot be compensated for, because
not a legal element of recovery. We shall consider first
the necessary proximity of the result assumed to be a legal
element of recovery.
(a) In Contrat.-We have seen that the sender and ad-
dressee of a telegram may sue, in many cases, in contract.
How proximate must be the injury which they suffer to
the breach of contract, in order that they may recover?
This question always is answered by saying that the injury
must come within the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale," and we
must consider, therefore, the rule laid down in that case."'
'Distinction was overlooked in i Sutherland, Damages (2d ed.), 92,
and this fact has caused much of the confusion in the telegraph cases-
e. g., in WYads'worlh v. W. U. T. Co., 86 Tenn. 695, x888.
U9 Exch. 34, 1854.
" It would be most interesting to have an essay on the measure of
damages in contract before Hadley v. Baxendale. That rule seems to
have been laid down through a lucky misunderstanding of an inac-
curate statement in Sedgwick. One has only to read the report of the
case in 23 L J. N. S. Exch. 179, to see how great was the influence of
Sedgwvick on the decision. He was one of the American law writers
best known abroad,a and his work on Damages, of which the second
edition had just appeared in 1852, was cited four times during the argu-
ment in Hadlcy v. Baxendale. Sedgwick professed to adopt the civil
law rule (see 2d ed. X12), but he seems to have misapprehended what
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It seems to be this: that compensation may be had for
those results of the breach of contract which a reasonable
man, lookingahead at the time that the contract was made,
wouldforesee as the likely consequences of his failure to ful-
fill his contract, under the then known circumstances. We
must keep this clearly in mind: the test is, what a reason-
able man really would foresee. It is very easy to consider
consequences which are natural results of a breach of con-
tract as equivalent to the consequences which an ordinary
man would anticipate, and to substitute for the measure of
damages in contract, viz., the usual consequences of known
conditions, the measure of damages in tort, viz., the nat-
ural consequences of unknown conditions.S We see this
done every day; e. g., Mr. Pollock says, "the liability of a
wrongdoer for his act is determined . . by the extent
to which the harm suffered by the plaintiff was the natural
and probable consequence of the act. This appears to be
also the true measure of liability for breach of contract."'"
This statement, we submit, is not accurate unless it be
always true that what the jury, at the time of trial,
that rule was. He appears to have believed that the measure of dam-
ages for breach of contract in the civil law was limited to those con-
sequences which the parties actually contemplated at the time that they
entered into the contract, and that if, as a matter of fact, they had not
looked ahead to any, there could be no recovery. Considering that
contract is purely a voluntary relation, there may be more than usually
is thought, to be said in favor of such a rule, and in opposition to a
rule which may impose on one party to a contract greater liabilities
and give to the other greater rights than either thought that he
was contracting for. However, it seems clear that the latr was really
the civil law view,b and Baron Alderson's famous paragraph is perhaps
an exact paraphrase of it. Inasmuch as, under the civil law, any sum
fixed by the parties was binding on them, as the measure of recovery,
it may be doubted whether the civil law rule was well adapted to our
system of law, where the tendency to hold invalid, estimates of dam-
ages made by the parties a priori is so strong.
Of course, strictly speaking, perhaps nothing which happens is
not natural, if that word be considered antithetical to stpenatural. As
applied to liability in tort, it should be considered as antithetical to
vnnaluraL. Just what unnatural signifies is not easy to state; it means
more than unusual and less than not according to the law of nature;
for if this latter meaning be given to it, liability would not be avoided
by showing a supervening cause.
"Torts (3d E. ed.), Sox.
a See the tone of his letter to Lord Bramwell, Fairfield, Memoirs of
Bramwell, 29, i89.
b Code Civil, art. ixio. Recoverable damages are those "qui ant N
pr&.us, ou qu'on a pu prvoir lors du contral."
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sees to have been a natural consequence of the breach of
contract would have been foreseen by a man, at the time
when the contract was made, as a consequence likely to
ensue its breach. When blue litmus paper is touched with
a colorless acid, any chemist would say that its change to
red was entirely natural, but what ordinary man, knowing
nothing of the character of litmus paper or of the acid,
would think such a change of color probable? There is a
great difference between results which are natural and
those which a reasonable man would foresee, and the lia-
ability of one who breaks his contract does not extend
beyond results of the latter kind, under the rule in Hadley
v. Baxcndale."T
Except in a very few cases, which we shall consider later,
the courts from the beginning have considered the rule of
damages laid down in that case as the one to be applied
in actions against a telegraph company for failure promptly
and properly to transmit and deliver telegrams." We pro-
pose now to consider the three possible situations which
may arise as the message discloses all the details of the
trinsaction to which it relates, or only the nature of the
transaction, or nothing about the transaction, and see
what the result of applying the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale
would be in each case. Then we shall consider whether
that rule should be applied at all, in the case of telegrams,
and if not, what rule should be applied.
I. If the message be a business message, and disclose in
itself, or if, when it is sent, there be told to the operator,
sufficient facts to enable him to know the "nature, import-
ance or extent of the transaction to which it related, or of
the position which the plaintiff would probably occupy if
the message were correctly transmitted,"" it may be that if
' Bohlen, Liability of Negligence, 40 Am. L Reg. (N. S.) 79, 8D,
Si, igoi; per Deemer, J., Mentzer v. I. U. T. Co., 93 Iowa, 752, 1895,
quoted infra, p. ioo.
' Stevcnson v. Montreal Tel. Co., 16 U. C. Q. B. 530. i858; Bryant v.
A.ncrican Tel. Co., i Daly, N. Y. 575, i866; Bodkin v. IV. U. T. Co., 31
Fed. 134, 1887; WV. U. T. Co. v. Hall, 124 U. S. 444, 888; TV. U. T. Co.
-v. U'ilson, 32 Fla. 527, 1893; Wf. U. T. Co. v. Odom, 21 Tex. Civ. App.
537, 1899.
Per Mr. J. Gray, in Prinrose v. V. U. T. Co., x54 U. S. x, at 33,
z894.
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the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale be applicable ever, to tele-
grams, it could be applied with propriety here."0 The com-
pany knowing the nature, importance or extent of the
transaction could be required, not unreasonably, to antici-
pate the damages which followed, not too remotely, its
breach of contract; and the same would be true if equiva-
lent details were disclosed in the case of a social mes-
sage.
It is evident, however, that had the plaintiff been al-
lowed to recover only in cases where he made known every
detail of the transaction to which his message related, re-
coveries would have been most unusual. In many cases
the very nature of the transaction requires that its details
be kept secret;71 and even where secrecy is not required,
the expense of sending such a message would be prohibi-
tive. Of commercial messages, it might be said, as it has of
social, that "to require the family pedigree [the details of a
business negotiation] to be inserted in telegrams announc-
ing serious illness or death would deprive the greater part
of the public of the benefits of telegraphy."' 2  True, the
details might be told in the "unwilling ears" of the opera-
tor, but in how many cases would the operator have time
or inclination to hear them?
2. The impracticability of allowing recovery only when
all of the details of a transaction are disclosed has resulted
in an almost unanimous rejection by the courts of such a
requirement, and the adoption of a rule which seems to
hold it sufficient to warrant recovery that the nature of
the business should be made known, or that enough should
be shown to render it probable that some loss would fol-
low if it were not duly delivered. It is sufficient if the mes-
sage appear to be "a commercial message of value," ' or to
relate to a "matter of business which, if improperly deliv-
ered, might lead to pecuniary loss,"" or to "a commercial
" Candee v. W. U. T. Co., 34 Wis. 471, i874 (Semble); Bcaupri v.
P. and A., 21 Minn. i55, 1874.
" Per Guffy, IV. U. T. Co. v. Eubank, IOO Ky. 591, at 604, 1897.
" Per Marr, J., IV. U. T. Co. v. Roseniretcr, So Tex. 406, at 419, 189i.
" TV. U. T. Co. v. Blanchard, 68 Ga. 299, 1882.
"Pepper v. W. U. T. Co., 87 Tenn. 554, i889.
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business transaction""T or a "pending trade,"" or if the
operator should have foreseen "serious consequences""
from its careless delivery, or if enough was shown "to put
an ordinary and prudent person upon inquiry."18 This
view has been held, almost without exception, to be in
strict accordance with the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale,"
and has been applied, necessarily to social, as well as to
commercial messages."
A glance at a very early and at a very late case will show
to what a flattering length the courts have gone in their
estimation of the actual foresight of i reasonable man.
In Squire v. W. U. T. Co."1 there was a delay in the de-
livery of the following message: "Will take your hogs at
your offer."
The court said that the action was ex-contractu, laid
down the rule that "a party can be held liable for breach of
a contract only for such damages as are the natural or
necessary and immediate and direct results of the breach-
such as might properly be deemed to have been in con-
templation of the parties when the contract was entered
into"8 -- and allowed the sender to recover the difference
between the contract price, which posterity has no more
means of knowing than the telegraph company had, and
the market price, of 250 dressed hogs. If it be said that
one looking at the message as sent would have known that
"your hogs" meant 250, and not two or 2,000 hogs, not
undressed, but dressed, and that "your offer" was whatever
it may have been, we may ask with reason, "What manner
of man is this?"
"P. T. C. Co. v. Lathr-p, 131 Ill. 575, i89o; IV. U. T. Co. v. Carver,
15 Tex. Civ. App. 547, 1897; WV.U. T. Co. v. Turner, 6o S. W. 432, Tex.
i9oI; Commission Co. v. IV. U. T. Co., 74 S. W. 876, Mo. x9o3.
"Herron v. W. U. T'. Co., 90 Iowa, i29, 1894.
" Garrett v. W. U. T. Co., 83 Iowa, 257, 1891.
" Brooks v. WV. U. T. Co., 72 Pac. 499, Utah, i903.
The only doubt which we have found expressed as to the propriety
of such an application is in Bierhaus v. W. U. T. Co., 8 Ind. App. 246,
1893.
" W. U. T. Co. v. Adams, 75 Tex. 531, 1884.
'98 Mass. 232, 1867.
"Per Bigelow, C. 3., at 238.
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In WV. U. T. Co. v. Birge-Forbes Co., 3 the message which
was not delivered promptly enough read, "All right. Sell
bluffing each described amply."
The Texas court held that a reasonable man would have
foreseen, as a likely consequence of the failure promptly to
deliver this message, that the sender thereby would lose
thesale of 2oo bales of cotton at I i3/Y cents per pound."'
When we reach such a decision, there are but two alter-
natives-either the courts are not applying the rule in Had-
Icy v. Baxendal, or they are interpreting that rule as mak-
ing something other than the actual contemplation of a
reasonable man the measure of damages. They profess to
apply the rule in Hadley v. Baxcndalc, but they seem to
have construed the first branch of the rule in Hadley v.
Ba.rcndalc-that the damages "should be such as may
fairly and reasonably be considered arising naturally, i. e.,
according to the usual course of things, from such breach
of contract itself"-to mean that the damages are not lim-
ited to what the parties, as reasonable persons, should have
foreseen at the time when the contract was made, as con-
sequences likely to follow its breach, but extend to all nat-
ural consequences, not too remote. If there be any differ-
ence between the measure of damages in tort and in con-
tract, and we imagine *that few would deny that there is,"
we submit that the first branch of the rule in Hadley v.
Ba.rendale was not meant to make the test in contract just
exactly what it is in tort-viz., are the injuries complained
of natural and not too remote consequences of thewrong?-
and to render superfluous the second branch of that rule.
The frequent suggestions in the cases, that if the telegram
itself did not disclose enough of the contract, it was the
operator's duty to inquire about the nature and details of
the transaction to which the message related, 6 show that
the courts have realized that no leasonable man, from the
facts disclosed, would have anticipated the injury which
369 S. W. x8i, Tex. 1902.
" See also IV. U. T. Co. v.. Nagle, iri Tex. Civ. App. 539, I895.
"For a vigorous statement in accord with these views, see W. U. T.
Co. v. Wilson, 32 Fla. 527, 1893.
"TV. U. T. Co. v. Carter, 85 Tex. 58o, 1893; W. U. T. Co. v. Turner,
16o S. W. 432, Tex. 190I; 2 Redfield, Railways, § x89b, ff 1g.
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resulted. As to the suggestions themselves, if such a doc-
trine were sanctioned in the telegraph cases, consistency
would require its application of every action of contract,
and would substitute a rule en!.irely different from any
heretofore known in these actions.
3. That such a new rule was not intended to be sanc-
tioned is evident from the fact that. theverycourtwhichhas
urged it most has refused to apply it to the case of cipher
messages.87 If the message disclosed that some loss will
follow its careless delivery, Hadlc, v. Baxendale is held to
warrant the recovery of all the damage, not too remote,
which follows; but if the message be in cipher, onlynominal
damages can be recovered. If the operator be under a
duty to require the further information in any case, one
would have thought that he would be so bound when the
message was entirely unintelligible to him, and one might
have thought, even, that if the anticipation of some injury
alone be required to bring the case within the rule of
Hadicy v. Baxendale, the mere fact of the message having
been sent in cipher should cause such anticipation in the
mind of a reasonable man. One cannot but feel surprised
that so practical a judge as Dixon, C. J., should say that
an operator might-presume that a cipher message was "a
mere item of news, or some other communication of tri-
fling and unimportant character." 8
However, e; cept in Virginia, 0 Alabama,"0 Georgia,"
Kentucky 2 and probably 'Mississippi'" the sender or ad-
Davidson v. IV. U. T. Co., .39 S. NV. 6o5, Tex. 1897.
SCandce v. IV. U. T. Co., 34 Wis. 471, 1874, at 480. In Saunders v.
Stuart (L. R. I. C. P. D.), 3--6, 1876, the operator admitted that he
knew the cipher telegram to be a business message, and yet only nomi-
nal damages were allowed to the plaintiff; but in IV. U. T. Co. v. Bell,
24 Tex. Civ. App. 572, xgoo, the operator was alleged to have known
the importance of the cipher message, and although the court did not
comment on the fact that the message was in cipher, it considered the
question as though that fact would have had no effect on fhe right
of recovery.
. IV. U. T. Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173, 1883.
" Daughtcry v. Am. Tel. Co., 75 Ala. i68, 1883.
"Dodd Co. v. P. T. Co., 112 Ga. 685, i9OI.
IV. U. T. Co. v. Eubank, 1oo Ky. 591, x897 (dictum).
"Shingcur v. IV. U. T. Co., 72 Miss. 1030, 1895. See dissenting
opinion in Show v. P. T. Co., 79 .Miss. 67o, at 695, 1902; P. T. Co. v.
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dressee of a cipher message can recover only norinal dam-
ages for its late or inaccurate delivery.9' The courts allow-
ing recovery of full damages either reject altogether the
rule in Hadley v. Baxendale-in the Daugherty case, Baron
Alderson's language was declared "in itself inapt and in-
accurate"-or else that rile hasbeenconsideredassanction-
ing recovery for all natural consequences, not too remote.95
The great majority of courts, seemingly forgetful that in
the cases like the Squire case, or the Birge-Forbes Comn-
pany case, they were in pari dclicto, have denounced with
vigor this interpretation of the rule. "The assertion as a
rule of law that one party to a contract shall alone have
kznowledge that a breach of that contract will directly result
in the loss of thousands of dollars, and that upon such
breach he can recover, of the other party to the contract, all
of such, to him, unforeseen, unexpected, unconteinplated, non-
conscntcd-to damages, seems to us to be a complete up-
heaval of all the old land-marks in reference to damages
upon broken contracts, and the establishment of a new
rule, that is neither fair, just nor equitable; and which, if it
is to be applied to the broken contracts of telegraph com-
panies, must also, according to every principle of consist-
ency, be applied under like conditions to every violated
contract." 6
This, it seems to us, is sound argument, and we cannot
but ask ourselves why it was not applied in the case of
messages which, although not in cipher, are so condensed
that they give as little information as if they were. Cer-
tainly the suggestion that recovery is denied in the case of
a cipher message, because no one but the sender and the
Rhelt, 33 S. 412, Miss. 1903; Florida adopted that view originally,
IF. U. T. Co. v. Hycr, 22 Fla. 637, 1886; brt later overruled the Hyer
case, W'. U. T. Co. v. Wilson, 32 Fa. 527, 1&,3; in Pennsylvania, P4 U.
T. Co. v. Landis, 21 W. N. 38, i888, is overruled practically by Fer-
gusson v. Ang'-Anm. Tel. Co., 178 Pa. 377, 1896.
IV. U. T. Co. v. Candee, 34 Wis. 471, 1874; P. T. Co. v. Lathrop, 131
Ill. 575, i8o; Primrose v. IV. U. T. Co., 154 U. S. 1, 1894; Fcrgusson v.
Anglo-Am. Tel. Co., 178 Pa. 377, 1896; Lumber Co. v. IV. U. T. Co., 44
S. NV. 309, W. Va. 19o3 (doubting the propriety of this prevailing doc-trine).' I. U. T. Co. v. Way, 83 Ala. 542, 1887.
"Per Taylor, J., in IV. U. T. Co. v. Wilson, 32 Fla. 527, at 532, x893.
(Italics are those of court.)
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addressee knowing its real meaning, they could fraudu-
lently give to it whatever signification would enhance their
damages most,"7 would apply quite as much to a message
like the one in the Squire case.
Whether the message be in cipher, or in language so
brief that all the details of the transaction to which it re-
lates are not disclosed, we believe that under Hadley v.
Baxendale recovery must be limited to nominal damages,
for no reasonable man would have anticipated the injury
which actually occurred.
But we further believe that for two substantial reasons
the rule in Hadley v. Baxendalc should not be applied in
these telegraph cases.
i. lany of the actions are brought for inaccuracy in
the transmission of messages. Let us take such a mes-
sage as this:--
"Buy me 5,ooo bushels of corn at 57 cents per bushel."
If that message be not delivered at all, it is not difficult
to'foresee what damage will be suffered. So, if it be deliv-
ered late; an exact estimate of the damage cannot be made,
it is true, for the market is not invariable, and the length
of the delay cannot be foretold. But at any rate, an ap-
proximate estimate can be made-as close a one as can be
made in the case of other contracts. But suppose that the
message be transmitted inaccurately. The questions to
which such a contingency would give rise are different
manifestly from those which can arise in any other depart-
ment of the law of contracts; and yet, the courts, appar-
ently without hesitation, have gone on applying "systems
that are not similar and principles that are not analogous"
until one wonders whether the "reasonable man" of Hadley
v. Baxendale could be anything less than an omniscient
divinity.
The possible changes in the message are as numerous as
are the words of the English language... "Buy" may be-
" Fergusson v. Tel. Co., z78 Pa. 377, x896.
"Although, of course, if the inaccuracy be so great as to put the
sendee on notice that a mistake was made, he cannot act on the mes-
sage and hold the company liable for the damages: Germania Fruit Co.
v. IV. U. T. Co., 7o Pac. 6s8, Cal. lgo2.
LIABILITY OF TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.
come "sell"; "5,ooo" may become "50" or it may become
"50,000"; "57" may become "5o" or it may become "67";
"corn" may become "oats"; "pears" has become
peaches"; '"' "Twenty-two" has become "Thirty-three";...
"Valley Falls" has had every letter changed and become
"Neosha Falls"; o1 a message sent, "Mother started at
nine," was received, "Mother (lied at nine. 1.. In view of
the utter impossibility of foreknowing how a message may
be altereO in transmission, it is submitted that the rule of
Hadley v. Ba.rendae should not be applied to this class of
telegraph cases at least.
2. But there is a broader consideration which, we feel,
should operate to prevent the application of Hadley v. Bax-
cndale to these telegraph cases at all; and this considera-
tion does not concern the anticipation of the parties. The
contract which the sender makes with the telegraph com-
pany is to transmit a message, and it is not to buy or to
sell merchandise; and it seems unfair that the liability of
the telegraph company should depend absolutely on the
terms of the contract which the sender may desire to make
with the addressee, and in which the company has not the
slightest interest. It is repugnant to what we conceive to
be the law of contracts, tih.t A. and B., by the contract
they make, shall be able, without any. apparent restriction,
to extend or to diminish the liabilities of C., who stands in
no relation whatever, as to the contract, to either A. or B.
It is well settled in the case of a common carrier that if he
carry carelessly goods which the consignor had told him
were being sent to fill a sub-sale, the consignor, if the sub-
sale be lost owing to this negligence, can recover his loss
of profits, if the sub-sale were at the market price, and if the
price to be paid were extraordinarily high, the consignor
can recover even those unusual profits, if only he have in-
formed the carrier that the profits would be unusually
high; but this rule we believe on principle very question-
IV. U. T. Co. v. Cook, 61 Fed. 624, 1894.
IV. U. T. Co. v. Richmotid, ig NV. N. C. 569, 1887.
IV. U. T. Co. v. Crall, 38 Kans. 679, 1888.
IV. U. T. Co. v. HiZes, 22 Tex. C. I. V. App. 315, 1899; and see
IV. U. T. Co. v. Palon, 55 S. V. 973, Tex. z9oo.
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able. and we doubt whether Hadley v. Baxendale was in-
tended to sanction it."" That rule should be limited to
cases where, as the liability on one party to the contract
increases by reason of his knowledge of the increased risk,
lie is able to demand greater compenbation from the other
party for assuming the risk, or be able to refuse the con-
tract altogether. The court assumed in Hadley v. B axcn-
dale that the common carrier had such power; "had the
special circumstances been known, the parties might
specially have provided for a breach of the contract, by
special terms as to damages in that case; and of this advan-
tage it would be very unjust to deprive them." "hether
this was or is the fact as to common carriers, we have seen
that it is emphatically not so as to telegraph companies.
If you write out a message-
"Buy IO shares Steel,"
and then write out another-
"Buy IO,OOO shares Steel,"
and ask the operator to send both, lie must send them, and
may not charge you more for sending the second than for
sending the first; and yet, in the latter case, you have mul-
tiplied the potential liability, i. e., the risk, of the company
I,OOO times. It cannot be denied that any reasonable man
would contemplate that the risk was thus increased i,ooo
times, but what avails him his ability to contem plate, if he
have no ability to avert, the danger. It is merely a question
whether a man condemned to walk from the Tarpeian
Rock prefers doing so blindfold or with his eyes open. If
his eyes are open, he can see when he reaches the edge of
the precipice, but what good does that do him, if lie must
walk ahead? It has been suggested that the notice of the
increased risk does help the company in this, that it is en-
abled to take greater care in dealing with the message;
e. g., it might repeat it. 0 4 Without intending to be cap-
" Cf. Mfayne's criticism of the rule, Damages (6th ed.), 31, and his
third suggested rule, 4i: "'Vhere the defendant has no option of re-
fusing the contract, and is not at liberty to requirc a higher rate of
remuneration. the fact that he proceeded in the contract after knowl-
edge or notice of such special circumstances is not a fact from which
an undertaking to incur a liability for spiecial damages can be inferred."
I" lW. U. T. Co. v. IFilson, 32 Fla. 527, 1893; Cannon e al. v. IV. U. T.
Co., ioo N. C. 300, 1888.
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tious, one cannot but suggest that if knowledge of the
importance of the message would stimulate the operator's
care, it would be very likely equally to excite his appre-
hension and so his nervousness. Again, there are so many
cases in which repetition would be useless, that that ex-
pedient would protect the company in few cases. If the
sender himself paid for repetition, it would seem that the
notice to the company -would not enable it to protect itself
any further at all. And finally, what consideration does
the sender of a most valuable messagi give, more than
the sender of an unimportant one, which should require
the company at its risk to adopt extraordinary precau-
tions for its safety? Is it a defense to any action for breach
of contract that the defendant did the work which he con-
tracted to do, carelessly, because he had no notice that it
was important work? No; the law says that in the trans-
mission of all messages the company must use an equal
-amount of care, and to say that if the importance of the
message be known to it, its obligation is to use greater
care, is, it seems to us, an assertion, practically, that a nude
promise is binding."'
If it be true that "in matters of contract, the damages
to which a party is liable for its breach ought to be in pro-
portion to the benefit he is to receive from its perform-
ance," 108 we submit that as long as telegraph companies
are bound to transmit without discrimination and with
equal care every message given to them, at uniform rates,
the principle that their liability is increased by a notice
which in no way increases their rights should not be ap-
plied.""
From these two considerations, we submit that even if
in the telegraph cases more than nominal damages could
be recovered by an application of the rule in Hadley v.
"' Pollock, Torts (3d ed. English), 5o2, note o.
Mayne, Damages (6th ed.), io, xx.
"'It will be a good day for the law when we have a scientific dis-
cussion of the part which notice plays in regulating liability. We
should not be surprised if it should be established some day that notice
was originally only a circumstance which affected a man's conscience,
and that its effect should be limited to cases of purely equitable char-
acter, where the state of a man's conscience is the moving influence.
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Baxendale, that rule should not be applied; hence, that if
the sender or addressee sue in contract, he should not re-
cover more than nominal damages.
(b) In Tort.-We have seen that he has a cause of action
in tort, provided he have suffered as a consequence, admis-
sible under the measure of damages in tort, injury recog-
nized by the law. Leaving for later consideration what ele-
ments of injury are so recognized at law, we must con-
sider in what relation the injury must stand to the wrong,
to be recoverable for in tort.
In tort, a plaintiff may recover for all legal elements
of injury which result naturally and not too remotely from
the wrong. It has been deplored that a rule so vague
must be adopted, but the necessity for such indefiniteness
arises from the nature of the case. It is not, as a rule, diffi-
cult to say whether any particular injury is a natural con-
sequence of the wrong, if we regard natural as meaning
according to the course of nature under normal circum-
stances. The mere occurrence of an injury makes that
injury a natural consequence within the rule, unless it
be shown that an external force, usually a natural force
but one under ordinary circumstances dormant, inter-
vened and directed the course of events to a result un-
usual in a normal condition of nature. It is much more
difficult to determine what consequences are not too
remote. One cannot say just where the line should be
drawn between what is and what is not sufficiently proxi-
mate, but it is crdinarily not difficult to-decide whether
a given consequence is or is not. As in looking through
a field-glass, it is almost impossible to say just where one's
ability to distinguish objects stops, and yet it is easy to tell
whether a given object be or be not within the range of
vision. But we need not consider the question of necessary
proximity here. The measure of damages both in tort and
in contract assumes that the injury in question is not too
remote. We found that the loss from the late or inaccurate
delivery of telegrams was in very few cases a loss which
the parties would have anticipated as reasonable men. Is
the loss a natural result of the non-delivery or of the care-
less delivery of a message? If "Narreenda" means "Buy
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5oo bales of cotton," is not a loss of profits on 5oo bales of
cotton just as natural a loss from the non-delivery of the
telegram, although not a result which could have been antici-
patcd so well, as if the message had read, "Buy 5oo bales of
cotton?"1"8 As soon as we leave the hypothetical question,
"would a reasonable man have anticipated this injury?"
and come to the question of fact, "is this injury a natural
consequence of the wrong?" it seems to us that nine-tenths
of the difficulties which we have been considering disap-
pear. Be the message a full exposition of the transaction,
be it so brief as to be unintelligible, or be it in cipher, and
be the wrong complained of the non-delivery, or the late
delivery, or the inaccurate delivery of the message, the
injury suffered is equally natural, and, if not too remote,
is equally recoverable for.
It will be objected, of course, that this rule imposes on
the telegraph company an even greater hardship than does
the misapplication of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, and
that any criticism of the application of that rule on the
ground that it increases the liability, without increasing
the rights of the company, could be made with even
greater propriety to the adoption of this view. This objec-
tion overlooks the fundamental distinction between the
nature of liability in contract and liability in tort, based
on the fact that contra,.tual liability is, as has been said,
"the child of consent," while delictual liability is imposed
without any consideration of the obligee's willingness to
assume it. The !iability which surrounds certain status,
whether the status themselves be entered into voluntarily
or not, is entirely "the child of law," so to speak. If two
men unlawfully strike two-boys with equal force, and one
boy drops dead because of an extraordinary and unknown
physical condition, while the other boy runs off unharmed,
there is no ethical reason, perhaps, why one man should be
imprisoned for life and the other man let off with a light
fine. And yet, we can see that there is an ethical basis for
'* Mr. Pollock falls into the curious error of asserting that since a*
companywould have no notice of the probable consequences of the inac-
curate transmission of a cipher message, therefore such consequences
would be too remote: Torts (3d English ed.), 498. How could notice
make suffic;ently proxinate that which is too remote?
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the attitude of the law which brings about this result.
Everv man is different from every other man-that is the
work of God-and to bold that A., who was made weak
and dependent, should be entitled to no more protection
than would keep altogether harmless B., who was created
strong and well able to take care of himself, would be as
impolitic as it would be uncharitable."' However, the rule
is unquestionable, that in tort the defendant's liability
for a wrongful aL. is not limited to consequences which, as
a reasonable man, he should have foreseen, but extends to
.'all the injurious results which flow therefrom by the ordi-
nary natural sequence, without the interposition of any
other negligent act or overpowering force. '
Nor is the company entirely unprotected. First of all,
it has the immense protection of the rules against remote-
ness, and against intervening causes. Second, it has the
protection of any valid conditions of the contract entered
into with the sender, and if the sender represented the
addressee in making the contract, the latter can no more
escape the effect of these conditions, by suing in tort, than
could the sender by a similar change in the form of his
action."" If, however, the addressee bear no contractual
relation to the company, the company, of course, cannot
set up, to defeat his action, conditions of contract between
it and the sender."'
We have finished now two parts of our subject. We have
found that a telegraph company is always in a con.tractual
relation to the sender of a message, and frequently to its
addressee; but that, by virtue of the public nature of its
duty, it is invariably under a delictual liability to both, and
, It would seem, if this ethical consideration be the true basis for
the rule. that a man whose weakness was due to his own vice should
be entitled to less protection than one whose weakness is inherent.
Although such is not the law, Maguire v. Shcehan, 117 Fed. 8mg, 19oa,
we take it that this is due rather to practical difficulties of proof than
to any theoretical stand of the court.
Quoted per Ladd, J., in McPcck v. lIV. U. T. Co., io7 Iowa, 356, at
362, i8gg.
. Colt v. . U. T. Co., 130 Cal. 657. xgoo; IV. U. T. Co. v. Waxel-
baum, 113 Ga. 1017, 1go1; Young v. IV. U. T. Co., 65 S. C. 93, i9o3.
Bigelow, L C., on Torts, 624, 1875; Tobin v. 11I. U. T. Co., 146 Pa.
375, 1892 (Question: was not the sender the sendee's agent?); IW. U.
T. Co. v. fames, 162 U. S. 65o, x896.
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either sender or addressee may sue on this cause of action
if he suffer, within the limit of necessary proximity, dam-
ages of a kind recognized by the law..
We attempted to show, then, that suit on the con-
tractual liability of the company would be little protection
to either sender or addressee, because, according to the
proper measure of damages in contract, only nominal dam-
ages should be recovered; but that in tort, there could be
a substantial recovery.
We come finally to the most difficult part of our subject,
and the one which has been a continual battleground of
jurisdictions: Granted that the sender or the addressee can
sue in tort and that he can recover for injuries naturally,
and not too remotely consequent on the wrong, the ques-
tion remains, for what injuries so situated can he recover?
In other words, what injuries does the law recognize as
legal elements of damage?
2. The Elcincits of Damages.
(a) In Contract.-Although, as we have attempted to in-
dicate, we believe that a substantial recoveryin an action on
the company's contractual liability cannot be given con-
sistently with legal principles, it must be admitted, never-
theless, that many courts have allowed substantial recov-
eries in such actions; and to trace our subject to its con-
clusion, we must consider how they have considered the
problem of the legal elements of damage in contract ac-
tions.
Physicians, scientists, clergymen, statesmen would all
tell us of different kinds of possible injuries which a man
could suffer, but interesting as it might be to attempt a
list of these injuries, we must content ourselves with a very
rough division of them into three classes--emotional,
physical and pecuniary. Now, in dealing with breaches
of contract, the law might have taken the view that if a
reasonable man would have anticipated that any of these
classes of injuries would result from a breach of his con-
tract, and any did result as a consequence not too remote,
he should be liable for it. This would be, in effect, to say
that all kinds of damage which come within the limit of
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Hadley v. Baxendale are legal elements of damage; that
that case supplies the test, not only of the extent, but of
the elements, of damage recoverable. Many of the cases
in which a plaintiff, suing in contract, has been allowed to
recover for emotional injuries, due to the careless delivery
of a telegram, have gone on this ground; mental anguish
can be recovered for, because it was "caused by the breach
of the contract, and was contemplated as a part of the con-
sequences of such breach at the time the contract was en-
tered into." '13  On principle, this result seems logical and
proper, and the ease with which it can be applied, as well as
its evident justice, make one wish that the law had adopted
it.
11 '
It is well settled, however, and almost universally con-
ceded, that "direct pecuniary loss" is the only element of
damage recoverable in an action ex contractu. How the
rule came to be established has not been explained satis-
factorily. To say that the court always retained the power
of construing contracts, and that it therefore could and
did limit the elements of damage which the jury could con-
sider, may be true, but it is not sufficient. It does show
that the early judges considered pecuniary loss the only
clement of damage which the law ought to recognize,
but it does not give any hint of the premises upon which
they built to reach this conclusion. Why should the court
have tried to prevent the jury from recompensing a plain-
tiff who suffered other than pecuniary .injury from a breach
of contract? We believe that there were three reasons:
= The W. U. T. Co. v. Simpson, 73 Tex. 422, at 426, 1899.
lUThe courts allowing recovery for mental anguish have applied
the rule consistcntly to other than telegraph cases: R. R. v. Hull, 68
S. W. 433, -y. i9o2; Dunn v. S1nilh, 74 S. W. 576, Tex. 19o3 (a most
interesting case where, the plaintiffs being joint contractors, a joint
recovery for mental anguish was sustained). The latter class we do
not consider good illustrations of the position, because in all of them
the recovery can be supported on the ground that the action is really
cx delict. S. S. Co. v. Wood, i8 Pa. Sup. 488, igoi, shows how easy
it is to fall into this position. The court, and even the eminent coun-
sel for the defendant, seem to have had no doubt but that if physical
injury was such a consequence of a breach of the contract as the party
should have foreseen, it was a recoverable element of damages. This
would be all right in Texas or Kentucky, but we cannot think that our
Pennsylvania courts are going to make the elements of recovery in
contract the same as those in tort. Still, Hobbs v. Ry., L. R. io Q. B.
111, 1875, seems to take that view.
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First, the infrequency of cases, when a breach of contract
caused other than pecuniary results which were not too re-
mote to be recoverable, even had they been considered
legal elements of damage; secondly, the difficulty of ascer-
taining the exact pecuniary equivalent for any but a pe-
cuniary loss, and thirdly, and, we believe, most important,
although least tangible, the early conception of the court
as a kind of Spartan parent, totally lacking in what Kent
calls "the fine feelings of social sympathy." The judges,
like the surgeons. did their wvork without anestlietics. If
the community in general has grown more materialistic
since those early days, we cannot but feel -that the courts
have grown less so."'  However that may be, the rule is
fixed, and fixed, we believe, without exception,- unless the
action for breach of promise of marriage be considered an
ordinary action ex contractu.
So mu--h has been made of these actions by the cases
which assert that the elements of damage in contract may
consist of other than pecuniary losses that it becomes
necessary to consider their real nature. Are they really
actions cx coniractu? If so, did the court intend to lay
down in them a measure of damages different than that
applied to other contract actions? In considering this lat-
ter question, we must not forget that the measure of dam-
ages in contract was not at all definite until Hadley v.
Baxcudac, and that a scientific consideration of this part
of the law was not begun until Sedgwick's time.
Originally the action was treated as strictly cx contractu,
and damages were restricted to the plaintiff's temporal
loss. "Here is a temporal loss, and therefore a temporal
action doth lie," said the court in next to the earliest re-
ported case of breach of promise,"" and the same thought
was expressed in the leading early case on the subject.""
The action developed strictly on contract principles for a
"'"The common law of to-day recognizes and protects numerous
rights which were ignored in the ruder ages of its history. Our sav-
age progenitors were not a sentimental people, and their common law
knew no wrong that did not wound the person or injure the property."
Editor in 5 Va. Law R. E. G. 711, 900.
"'Baker v. Smith, Style 295, I65x.
" Holcroft v. Dickinson, Carter, 233, i672-
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long time, and not until 7796, we believe, was any depart-
ure made therefrom."' Lord Kenyon decided then that
the physical infirmity of the intended husband entitled the
wife to refuse to marry him, without subjecting herself to
damages for breach of contract. This was clearly a neces-
sity of public policy, but it in no way affected the question
of the measure of damages. It must be admitted, how-
ever, that the practice in England since that time has,
in respect to the measure of damages, been at variance
with what we are accustomed to consider the correct meas-
ure in contract. But outside of this fact, we believe the
action for breach of promise of marriage to be an action
strictly cx contractu,"9 and we feel that the conditions
which gave rise to the exceptional measure of dam-
ages have disappeared to a great extent; so that within a
few years the measure of damages will be quite as strict in
case of breach of the marriage contract as in case of the
breach of any other contract. There are only two reasons
why suits of this character are brought: First, for money,
and second, for vindication of the loss of virtue. In the
former case there is no reason why the damages should not
be limited, as in other contract actions, to the woman's
pecuniary loss; her "loss of market," as it was called in
Scotch law. in the latter case, the action is in reality for
seduction, and although the form of action is preserved as
ex contractu, in order to enable the woman to sue, the
whole case is tried as if it were an action for seduction. Tt
is really an action by the person seduced herself. Lord
Herschell, whose pet aversion the action for breach of
promise was, tried time and again to have the action abol-
ished altogether,12' and as there are multiplied statutes
which make seduction under promise of marriage a mis-
",Alciinsos v. Baker, 2 Peake, 1o3, 1796.
" It survives as action ex contractu: Finlay v. Clhirncy, 2o Q. B. D.
494, M387; a case which is usually said to have established that an action
for breach of promise does not survive, but which really held that, like
any other contract action, it did survive as far as it was brought to
recover pecuniary loss; vide at 5o7. Its performance is excused under
same circumstances as is that of ordinary contract: Hall v. Ii'right,
I E. B. & E. 746, 1858; Smith v. Compton, 55 Cent. Law J. 4o9, N. J.
19o
,2 Canada Law Rev. 92, i9o2.
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demeanor,'21 or allow a woman seduced to sue, 22 or her
father to sue without proving loss of service,2s the condi-
tions which gave rise to the abnormal measure of damages
in actions which were really for seduction are disappear-
ing, and the measure of damages will ultimately become
what it was from the beginning until within a century ago,
viz., the usual measure of damages according to the rule in
HadIcy v. Baxendale.12'
Hence we feel comparatively safe in saying that, until
the telegraph cases arose, there was no action really treated
as an action cx contractu in which damages could be recov-
ered, except for pecuniary injuries; and we cannot but feel
that had the courts which allowed recovery for mental an-
guish in the telegraph cases admitted this fact, their de-
cisions would have obtained a more respectful considera-
tion. For it is well settled, and none of the courts deny-
ing recovery in the telegraph cases have denied it, that
mental anguish was a legal element of damages in certain
tort actions,' and it is by an examination of these that we
think justification may be found for the so-called Texas
rule.
(b) It Tort.-The most perfect analogy to the telegraph
cases, it seems to us, is in the action for seduction. We all
know how, despite endless criticism, the cause of action in
such cases is a loss of service to the plaintiff as a conse-
quence of the defendant's wrong. Many had hoped that
the reaction which the legal mind of to-day is undergoing
to the specious fictions which so pleased and satisfied law-
' Rev. St. N. J. x295; Penal Code, § 284; Penal Code Cal. § 268;
Code of Va. 1887, § 3679; Pa. i P. & L Dig. Col. 1326; and others.
'= Code Ind. § 264; Rev. igox;- Code Iowa, 1897, § 3470; Code Tenn.
)896, § 4501; Ball. Ann. Code, Wash. § 4831; and others.
' Code Ind. Rev. i9ox, § 265; Ball. Ann. Code, Wash. No. 4830;
Code W. Va. 1899, C. 1o3, § i; and others.
IN For a strong advocacy of these views see White, Breach of Prom-
ise, io Law Quarterly, 135, 1&_j.
' When we consider that "Assumpsit was an action ex delicto per-
verted into a contractual remedy" (Salmond, History of Contract,
3 Law Quarterly, 166, at 171, 1887), it does seem illogical that the ele-
ments of damages should be different in tort and in contract. Perhaps
one cannot do better than to repeat Halsbury's words respecting the
theory which allows suit by an undisclosed principle: "If it is said it is
an anomaly, it certainly is not the only one in our law": Maxsfed Co.
v. Durant, App. Cas. Ipo, 24o, at 244.
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yers of a few centuries ago would lead to a change in the
theory of this action; but the old rule has been reasserted
with full force,"26 and relief, it seems, must be obtained
through legislation."'2 And yet, when we consider the
case a little, the theory does seem not illogical. Certainly
the woman herself could not sue. "She cannot complain
of that which took place by her own consent. Any differ-
ent rule would be an anomaly. '""8  Could her natural
guardian, usually her father, sue? If so, it must be in his
own right; the consent to the wrong, which barred the
woman's right, would bar any claim by another in her
right. What interest which the law could protect had the
father, that the seduction should not occur? The court, it
may be, could have said that it would protect his right not
to be "injured as the head of a family," as Mr. Pollock
suggests."' But, with submission, this principle is too-
vague for practical use, unless injury to a man as head of a
family mean-and Mr. Pollock himself seems to think that
it does-a wrong, the proximate consequence of which is
a loss of society or service."' And if it do mean that, is
the position suggested much different than that which the
law actually has taken? We suppose that seduction does
not deprive a man of his daughter's society in a legal sense;
so that, even on Mr. Pollock's theory, recovery could be
allowed only where the proximate consequence of the
wrong was a loss of service. The father's mental anguish
and humiliation were, it must be admitted, an equally
proximate consequence of the wrong, and the conclusion
reached by the courts certainly proves that the infliction
of this mental anguish was not considered a cause of ac-
tion. And yet, once the cause of action is established, the
circuit between injury and recovery is closed, and the men-
' WVitbourne v. Williams, 2 K. B. 722, i9oi; Hamilton v. Long, 36
Irish Law T. i8g, xgo2.
' It has been claimed that under the Code the fiction of service is
not required to be proved or even averred: Snidcr v. Nceull, 44 S. E.
354, N. C. 19o3, per Clark, C J.
Pollock, Torts (3d Eng. ed.), 2o8.
Ibid., 2o9.
Ibid., 207-8. "The same rule should extend to any wrong done
to a wife. child or servant, and followed as proximate consequence
by loss of their society or service."
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tal anguish does become an element of damages. That the
law of Torts has lagged here behind the law of Damages 31
is undeniable, and yet this is not the only instance in which
the same thing has occurred. We know how long it was
before malice, always recognized as an element of damages,
was recognized in any case as a cause of action. We k .ow
how long it was before Beven's theory, that the Lability
for established negligence extends to results c Jnsidered
too remote to be considered in establishing negligence, was
accepted.132
We are not unaware that the admission of this mental
anguish as an element of damages in actions of seduction
frequently is explained on a view which destroys its use as
an illustration for "the view for which we are contending,
viz., that the damages awarded are punitive, and hence ele-
ments are admitted which the court would exclude, were
the damages compensatory only.' But we feel that this
overlooks the circumstances under which exemplary dam-
ages are awarded and the nature of the parent's action.
The rule which Sedgwick laid down for the imposition of
exemplary damages was, "Where gross fraud, malice or op-
pression appears, the jury are not bound to adhere to the
strict line of compensation." 3' In other words, a plaintiff
may recover such damages only when the defendant has
acted toward him with gross fraud, malice or oppression.
The turpitude of the crime of seduction is, of course, enor-
mout,; but wherein, in its commission, is the element of
"gross fraud, malice or oppression" to the plaintiff, who is
not the -woman seduced, but her father? Could the daughter
sue, it may be that those elements could be found in every
case, but only in" most exceptional cases, it would seem,
Cheputan v. TV. U. T. Co., 88 Ga. 763; see 774, 1892.
Bohlen, Negligence.4o A.M. Law Reg. (N.S.) 79, at 85, 161, xgox.
' Intcrnational Ocean Tel. Co. v. Sounders, 32 Fla. 434, 1893; Connely
v. TV. U. T. Co., 4 Va. Sup. C. T. 6, 1902. Mr. Greenleaf, in his famous
controversy with Mr. Sedgwick, as to the nature of what the latter had
called punitive damages. asserts that the damages for mental anguish,
in seduction, aie compensatory: 9 Law Reporter, 529, at 541, 1847.
Inasmuch, however, as Mr. Greenleaf denied that damages could be
ever anything but compensatory, we should not be justified in claim-
ing his support for our position.
" Damages (2d ed.), 454.
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could the father prove that the crime was committed with
fraud or with malice against him. The damages are strictly
compensatory.
If our reasoning be sound, the action of seduction fur-
nishes an instance in which a cause of action in tort having
been established, mental anguish resulting from the tort,
naturally and not too remotely, is an element of damages
for which the law gives compensation.
Damages for mental anguish are recoverable also in ac-
tions for false imprisonment," 5 malicious prosecution and
assault with or without"' battery. In each of these cases,
there exists a cause of action independent of the mental
anguish; and in all of them, recovery is allowed for that
mental anguish. These cases have been explained away by
the courts which refused to accept the Texas rule on two
grounds:-
I. In tort actions, the jury necessarily has a very wide
discretion, and the courts have an aversion, inherited from
an original incapacity, to set aside verdicts, even though
convinced from their size that forbidden elements of dam-
age have been considered by the jury. If these verdicts
have been allowed to stand only because the court felt itself
unable to say that they were incorrectly reached, it is sub-
mitted that the court never would have instructed the jury
that it was its duty to consider the alleged inadmissible
elements of dan.age; as it does constantly.
2. These torts are willful, and so entirely unlike a tele-
graph company's carelessness, and the damages are puni-
tive.'3 This objection, we think, comes from a confusion
of the cause of action with the elements of damage. The
-wilfulness is essential to the establishment df the cause of
action, and has nothing to do with the question of dam-
ages. Look at a few illustrations of what constitutes an
assault, for instance: "If a man strike at another, and do
not touch him, . . . so, if he lift up his weapon to strike,
but does not. . . . If he throw stones, water or other liq-
"' Butlcr v. Slockdalc, 19 Pa. Sup. 98, i9O2.
" Kline v. Kline, 64 N. . 9, Ind. i9o2.
IV. U. T. Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64, i9o.
" Comyns, title "Battery" (C).
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uor upon him"; evidently willfulness is inherent in the ac-
tion; and to say that damages are recoverable for mental
anguish because the act is willful is merely to say that dam-
ages are recoverable for mental anguish because the act,
being willful, is an assault; which is what we have at-
tempted to prove-that a cause of action being established
in tort, mental anguish is an element of damages therefor.
The courts following the Texas doctrine have relied fre-
quently on those cases where nervous shock or mental
anguish accompanies physical injuries caused by a defend-
ant's negligence; but the courts which allow recovery in
such cases so uniformly place their decisions on the im-
possibility of separating the physical injury and the mental
shock that we fear it is unfair to consider these cases as
supporting the view that the courts regaid mental anguish
as an element of damages. The courts rejecting the Texas
doctrine, on the other hand, rely with equal frequency on
the cases in which physical suffering consequent on ner-
vous shock caused by the defendant, without actual impact,
has been held not actionable. These cases are evidently dis-
similar, for the question in them is whether the shock, or,
to be more accurate, the ensuing physical injury, be a
cause of action, and not whether it be an element of dam-
ages when a cause of action exists."'
If, then, it be true that where there exists a right of ac-
tion in tort, mental anguish, which is a natural and not too
remote consequence of the act which gives the right of
action, is an element of damages which should be compen-
sated for, must we not conclude that a telegraph company
which is guilty of a breach of its public duty, whenever,
through negligence, it fails to deliver messages promptly
and accurately, should be liable to the sender or to the
addressee for mental anguish which is a not unnatural or
too remote consequence of this breach of duty? This
" In view of the very general citation of the court, adoptingwhatwe
may call, more for convenience than with accuracy, the "Northern"
rule, of Coultas v. Commissioners, L. R. 13, App. Cas. z22. 1888, it will
be interesting to note how they will treat the contrary decision of
Ahdicu v. I'Ihitc, L. R. 2 K. B. 669, i9oi. Massachusetts too, formerly
counted consistent advocate of the rule in the Coultas case, seems to be
wavering: Homatir v. Ry., i8o TMass. 456, i9o.
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breach of duty gives a cause for action to every individual
in the community which bestows upon the telegraph com-
pany its extraordinary powers, and it gives a right of ac-
tion to any one who is injured especially by it. Is not the
sender or the addressee who suffers mental anguish from
the breach a person thus specially injured, and should he
not be allowed to recover?
As is well known, many courts have said "Yes," and
more have said "No," and those which have said "Yes"
have differed as to why ihey so said, and those which said
"No" have differed as to why they so said. The battle of
the jurisdictions on this question is far from a closed chap-
tel of legal controversy. In many jurisdictions the ques-
tion has not arisen yet, and in those where it has arisen and
been decided, it is impossible to foretell how definitely it is
settled.
We propose first to make a chronological table of the
jurisdictions in which has arisen the question of the right
of either the sender or the addressee of a message whose
negligent delivery causes him no injury except mental
anguish to recover compensation for that anguish. Then
we shall consider the different theories upon which the
cases proceeded.
I. Jurisdictions in which cases involving the Texas doc-
trine have arisen:-
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2. Jurisdictions where negligent deli'-ery of message has
caused physical, as well as mental, anguish:-
Jursdlo-
Date. tion. Decision. Name. Citation.
IM.. Utah ........... Allowed..Brown T. W. U, T. Co....6 Utah, 019.
1694.. Iichian ...Allowed...Birkett v. W. U. T. Co... 1M Mie 361.
18.9...Arkan.sas ..Allnwed McCall v. IV. U. T. Co... 58 lNac. -. noted 9 Kans. App. 1S6.
1902...N, braska...Anowed..W. U.T. Co. v. Church...R N. W. 878
The two sensations in this branch of the law were the
overruling by the Ferguson case of the Reese case, and the
consequent swinging of Indiana into the ranks of the sup-
porters of the Northern rule, after an almost ten years'
service under the Texas doctrine; and the passage by
South Carolina, no doubt as a consequence of the Lewis
case, of a law forcing that state into the columns of the
Texas allies. A somewhat similar statute had been passed
in Virginia in i9oo,4° but the Connelly decision, clearly in
contravention of the legislative intent, held that statute
not to allow recovery for mental anguish where that was
the only consequence of the company's negligence. It is
not likely, however, that a similar fate will befall the South
Carolina act, which provides that "all telegraph companies
doing business in this state shall be liable in damages for
mental anguish or suffering, even in the absence of bodily
injury, for negligence in receiving, transmitting or deliv-
ering messages.""" The act shows by its very crudity-it
fails to say to whom the company shall be liable, speaks of
mental anguish without bodily injury, and not of mental
anguish without pccuniary injury, and treats of negligence
in receiving messages-the intensity of feeling which
prompted its passage.
This is the actual state of the law to-day: Nineteen states
and the federal courts have rejected the Texas rule; seven
states (including the civil law State of Louisiana) have
adopted it, and the legislature of one state, whose courts
followed the majority, has declared for the Texas rule.
Since i895, not a single court governed by the rules of the
common law has had the courage to join the minority,
and yet it is remarkable with what unanimity the text-
" Acts of i9o, 724.
" Acts of go1, 748, See. r.
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writers have advocated such a course."' And there is one
consideration which, we feel, it is only fair to bear in mind
in looking at the question of the numerical superiority of
the one line of cases over the other. There is scarcely a
more highly centralized industry in this country than our
telegraph system-a glance at the cases in which the men-
tal anguish question has arisen shows that in every one,
except that in Florida, the Western Union Telegraph
Company was the defendant. We suggest, without the
slightest spirit of prejudice, that the immense advantage
which the services of an experienced legal department,
familiar with the entire body of electric law, necessarily
affords, has been a not inappreciable factor in bringing
about the present state of the decisions.
The facts in all of these mental anguish cases vary so
little that any effort to distinguish them is useless.
The courts have not made any such effort, but have
taken their stand unequivocally and emphatically, either
for or against the Texas doctrine. It only remains to con-
sider the different theories upon which the decisions have
been based, for the reasoning, even in cases which reach the
same decision, is far from uniform, and to determine which
satisfy us best.
Texas.-It may be asserted with some degree of assur-
ance that the So Relle case,"" although very generally
cited as the best exponent of the Texas doctrine, does not
renresent the present theory of the law in Texas.1 4' That
case, although this is not altogether clear, seems to go on
the principle that the infliction of mental anguish, at least
if willful, constituted not only an element of damages, but
a cause of action. It was followed by the Levy cases,14"
which are even less clear. The. sendee of the telegram,
" Ecke, in 44 Cent. Law J. 176, 1897; Joyce, Elec. Law, See. 830,
Igoo; Watson, Personal Injuries, Sec. 450, 19oi; Voorhies, Personal
Injuries, Sec. i6, 29o3; Clifton, in 57 Cent. Law J. 44, 29o3. See the
slighting reference to the support by the text-writers of the Texas
rule, per Mitchell, J., in Frands v. W. U. T. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 263,
264, 1894.
'" So Redle v. W. U. T. Co., 55 Tex. 3o8, if8i.
""See W. U. T. Co. v. Stuart, 66 Tex. 58o, z886.
'" Gulf S. Ry. v. Isaac Levy, 59 Tex. 563, 1883; Gulf S. Ry. v. I. T".
Levy, 59 Tex. 542, x883.
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Isaac Levy, was denied a recovery because the infliction
of mental anguish was not a cause of action, and even if it
were admissible as an element of damages, a sendee had no
cause of action upon which a claim for damages could be
predicated-he had no cause of action ex contractu, because
the sender made the contract for his own benefit, and he
had none ex delicto, because "no deprivation of any abso-
lute right of the person has been stated which would en-
title the appellee at least to nominal damages." The
sender of the message, J. S. Levy, on the other hand, was
permitted to recover apparently on the ground that he
had a cause of action, and although this was ex contractu,
still, the code having abolished the distinction between
actions ex contractu and those ex dclicto, damages could be
recovered as though the cause of action were of the latter
kind;1" but the court did seem to think that the sender
had a right cx delicto, too, this right growing out of the
public nature of the telegraph company's duty. If. there
be such a right, one cannot but think that the court was
inconsistent in not holding it to give the sender also a
right ex delicto. This position was perhaps not very in-
telligible, but it settled two things-that the infliction of
mental anguish was never a cause of action, but that, if a
cause of action were established, it was an element of dam-
ages; and that the cause of action, whether exclusively ex
contractu or not, could arise only in favor of those who
'"The effect of the Code on the question of damages has been con-
sidered in several of the telegraph cases, and such important decisions
as Wadsworth v. W. U. T. Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 1888, have been considered
of little applicability in jurisdictions where there is no code: Chapman
v. IV. U. T. Co., 88 Ga. 763, 1892; Connelly v. TV. U. T. Co., 4 Va. Sup.
6, i9o2. Decisions in the code states undoubtedly do contain dicta to
the effect that the Code has assimilated the measure of damages in
contract with that in tort: See, e. g., United States Trust Co. v. O'Brien,
143 N. Y. 284, 1894; but when we remember the fundamental truth that
the Code was intended in no way to alter the substantive law, it be-
comes reasonably clear that these dicta were uttered in temporary for-
getfulness of the fact that the law of damages is part of the substantive
law, and that by the law of damages, the measures of relief in tort and
in contract are different. When the question flatly arises, the old
distinction is preserved; in tort, the liability is for natural results,
whether contemplated or not: Coy v. Gas Co., 146 Ind. 655, 1897; in
contract, the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale limits the liability to results
which should have been contemplated: TI'ctherbce v. Meyer, ISS N. Y.
446, xi89
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stood in a contractual relation with the company. The
Stuart case," 7 which followed the Levy cases, is probably
the best-considered case on the subject in Texas, and is
regarded there as the leading case. Again there is laid
down firmly the rule that mental anguish is not, standing
alone, a cause of action, but that it is an element of dam-
ages where the chasm between wrong and remedy has been
bridged over by a cause of action. Again we have a state-
ment of the effect of the code in obliterating the distinc-
tion between the measure of damages in tort and in con-
tract, but there is, perhaps more clearly indicated than in
the previous cases, the thought that the sendee of a tele-
gram can have no cause of action except in contract.
The ratio dccidcndi of the Stuart case has been adopted
with great uniformity in Texas, but one cannot but feel
that the results to which it has led are scarcely sustainable
on strict legal principles. We have adverted already to
what we believe to be a well-settled rule of the common
law-that mental anguish is not a legal element of dam-
ages in actions ex contractu.'" The Stuart case *ecessarily
involves a denial of that principle, or, as expressed in the
latter cases, an exception thereto. " We have also stated
the rule as to the right of the beneficiary of a con-
tract to sue in actions other than those against telegraph
companies, and shown how, in the latter class of cases, an
entirely different rule is adopted.'50 We propose now to
consider to what extent the beneficiary's right has been
carried in the telegraph cases. We shall not be surprised,
waen we recognize the eagerness of the Texan tribunals
to allow the plaintiff to recover, and when we remember
that the sendee could so recover only if he were the party
for whose benefit the message was sent,, that Gray's
prophecy should have been proven erroneous. He had said,
"The right of a third person to sue as beneficiary will be
... In IV. U. T. Co. v. Swcetnan, i9 Civ. App. 435, 1898, however,
there are dicta to the effect that mental anguish is not merely an ele-
ment of damage, but also a cause of action. Perhaps the most accurate
statement of the Texas rule is that in W. U. T. Co. v. Simpson, 73 Tex.
422, per Acker, P. J.: "Mental anguish may constitute an element of
actual damage for which compensation may be recovered upon breach
of contract." (Italics ours.) , rage 59.
1"4 W. U. T. Co. v. Arnold, 73 S. W. io83, Tex. i9o3. no Page 7.
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limited to the comparatively small class of cases in which
the person who employs the telegraph company to com-
municate the message does so solely to benefit the person
to whom the message is directed."'51  Let us examine, in
the light of that statement, a few of the Texas cases in
which the plaintiff has been allowed to recover as the party
"to be in fact accommodated, benefited or servd."''
We can understand readily that when the sender's wife
and child died, and the sender sent to his father this mes-
sage:-
"Bettie and baby dead. Come to Cleburne to-night
train to my help"-
the court should say, "Whatever contract was made by the
son was made for the benefit of himself, with no intent that
it should inure in any respect to the benefit of the appellee
(the sendee);"'"3 the effect of the late delivery being, as the
son alleged, that "he was compelled to put away the body
of said wife among strangers and to bear his heavy afflic-
tion alone, without the comfort and consolation of any
relative or friend." '' But we are a little surprised to find
that in the very next case, when the sender's brother was
very ill, and the sender sent to his sister this message:--
"Clara, come quick, Rufe is dying"-
the court should have had no difficulty in finding that the
contract was made for the benefit of the scndcc.'"5 And
when this message was held to be for the benefit of the
snder:-
"Come at once. Mr. Potts is not expected to live"-
and this for the benefit of the scnide:-
"Mr. Lampkin is worse. Come down at once"
5 -
the drift of the decisions became evident, that the court
would hold the contract to have been made for the benefit
of whichever party to the message happened to sue first.
Gray, Communication by Telegraph, Sec. 67.
TV W. U. T. Co. v. Adams, 75 Tex. 53r, at 536, i8s8.
1 Gulf & Ky. v. Isaac Levy, 59 Tex. 563, 566, 1883-
Gulf & Ky. v. J. T. Levy, 59 Tex. 542, 545, 1883.
"Adams v. TV. U. T. Co., 75 Tex. 5r3, 1889.
Polls v. W. U. T. Co., 82 Tex. 545, i8gi.
TY. U. T. Co. v. lobe, 6 Civ. App. 4o3, 1894.
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This was admitted practically the year after the Jobe case.
The jury found that the message:--
"Come at once. Allen is very low"--
was sent for the benefit of both sender and sendee; and
the sendee was allowed, nevertheless, to recover as theparty
for whose benefit the contract was made."58 The logical
conclusion would seem to be, that both the sender and the
addressee of a social message should be allowed to sue
ex contrachu for a failure of the company promptly and ac-
curately to deliver it. An opposite conclusion was reached
in the Levy cases, but they arose before the laxity of the
Texas rule became so great; in the present state of the
law, it seems doubtful whether those cases would be fol-
lowed upon the question of the party benefited. Since
1894, we have .not found, throughout the Texas reports, a
single case in which recovery has been denied on the
ground that the plaintiff, whether sender or addressee, was
not the person for whose benefit the contract was made.'
We cannot but feel that the unlegal shifts to which the
Texas rule has driven the courts of that state to resort
prove the inherent vice of any theory which makes the
right of recovery for mental anguish depend upon the es-
tablishment of a cause of action cx contractu, even if it be
admitted that mental anguish can be considered an ele-
ment of damage in contractual actions at all.
Accordingly, it does not seem strange that of those
states which have adopted the Texas doctrine, few have
based their decisions on the i;easoning of the Texas courts,
although in no case has there been a conscious recognition
that the Texas interpretation of the Texas rule was being
departed from.
Tennessee.-Wads-worth v. W. U. T. Co."' starts out and
attacks the problem in a most satisfactory way. The
sendee was suing for the mental anguish consequent on
the late delivery of two messages announcing the dying
• W. U. T. Co. v. Hale, ii Civ. App. 79, 1895. See also IV. U. T. Co.
v. Clark, 14 Civ. App. 563, 1896.
" Recovery was denied for that reason in W. U. T. Co. v. Wood, 57
Fed. 471, 1893; IV. U. T. Co. v. Henry, 87 Tex. 165, 1894.
" 86 Tenn. 695, i888, at 698.
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condition and then the death of her brother. "The mes-
sages in question were couched in decent language, and
were lawful in their purpose. Such being true, Walden had
a legal right to send them, and Mrs. Wadsworth had
a legal right to receive them; and it was the plain duty of
the defendant to deliver them promptly. Its dereliction
of duty and violation of her legal right unquestionably
gave her a right of action;" and (later, on the opinion)
"plaintiff having a clear right of action for some damage,
as we have already seen, may maintain her action, and re-
cover all the damage she may show herself to have sus-
tained by reason of the wrongful act of the defendant; and
in ascertaining the amount thereof, all proven elements of
damage, admissible in either form of action (tort or con-
tract), are for the consideration of the jury." There are
two elements in the case upon which the court relied,
and which other courts have relied on as distinguishing
the Wadsworth case from the cases before them. First,
as in the Texas cases, there is the Code, which the court
appeared to consider, by the fusion of all forms of action
into the single civil action, had extinguished the before-
existing difference in the measure of damages in tort and
in contract. There was no refusal to admit that such a dif-
ference had existed; the court pointed it out distinctly. Of
this attitude one can only say that it proceeds on an ex-
aggerated idea of the objects which the Code was intended
to accomplish." 1 A difference in the measure of damages
is undoubtedly a condition of the substantive law, and can
with no propriety be considered as within the purview of
a law obliterating procedural distinctions. Second, there
was a statute requiring the transmission of all messages
"correctly and without unreasonable delay." The part
which this statute played in the reasoning of the court was
that of imposing upon the telegraph company a general
duty of prompt delivery, breach of which would constitute
a cause of action. If it be true that this general duty
would exist even in the absence of statute, the case would
- In Mach. Co. v. Compress Co., 1o5 Tenn. x87, igoo, the court ap-
plied the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, in an action for breach of con-
tract, just as it would have done in the absence of any code.
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stand for the proposition that the failure of a telegraph
company punctually and properly to deliver messages is
the breach of a general duty, and hence a cause of action,
in suit on which, mental anguish approximately resulting
from it is an element of damage. When we consider the
consequence of denying the existence of this general duty,
the conclusion that it does exist seems almost inevitable.
If the company be under no genera. duty to deliver mes-
sages which do not concern commercial transactions, the
company, out of mere heartless malice, may destroy the
message as soon as it has received it under promise to
transmit, and be in no way liable to the addressee for the
misery and affliction which its conduct may have caused
him; for, it is conceived, the mere maliciousness of the
company's action could not be said to constitute a breach
of any duty owed to the addressee where, cx hypothesi, no
duty is owed to him. The only alternative is, as we have
tried to show, that the public nature of a telegraph com-
pany's employment does impose upon it a general duty to
do carefully the work for which its property is dedicated to
the use of the public. If this be so, the Wadsworth case
does stand for the proposition that the failure promptly
and accurately to deliver messages is a tort, and that, in
recovering therefor, mental anguish is an element of dam-
age.
This seems to be the view of the court in the only one of
the later Tennessee cases... which throws much light upon
the question: W. U. T. Co. v. Frith,"'8 where the court,
per Folkes, J., without referring either to the code or to
the statute, says: "Telegraph companies, like common car-
riers, are public servants, anid held to a very high degree of
diligence and a strict discharge of duty. . . . Having
violated its duty, and been negligent in its discharge, the
company is liable in damages. These damages must be
such as reasonably to compensate the party injured, not
11 R. R. v. Griffin, 92 Tenn. 694, 1893; TV. U. T. Co. v. Mellon, 96 Tenn.
66, i8g6 (absence of contractual relation between plaintiff and com-
pany held immaterial); TV. U. T. Co. v. Robinson, 97 Tenn. 638, x896;
Jones v. If. U. T. Co., ioi Tenn. 442, 1898; Gray v. IV. U. T. Co., 64
S. W. io63, go.
' 105 Tenn. 167, igoo, at 171.
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only for his pecuniary loss, but also for the mental anguish,
grief and disappointinent caused by the negligence." That,
we believe, is as logical as it is satisfactory.
Alabamna.-The Alabama courts have proceeded on a
less definite theory than have any of the other courts ad-
herents of the Texas rule. When recovery was first al-
lowed for -mental anguish, the distinction between the
Texas interpretation of the rule and the Tennessee inter-
pretation seems to have been recognized in a dim sort of
way. The possibility of a cause of action ex delicto ap-
parently was not recognized-at any rate, without a very
close analysis of the problem, the court accepted the Texas
view, deciding that where there was a cause of action ex
contractu, mental anguish was admissible as an element of
damages."' The converse of the rule was laid down, too--
that if there were no contractual relation between the
plaintiff and the sender, no action could be maintained.""
The latest cases, however, involve in considerable doubt
the exact position of the Alabama courts. The right of
the addressee might have been developed according to the
Texas view; but, more, we imagine, from the unfavorable
attitude of the Alabama courts to the entire class of ac-
tions,""8 than from any realization of the unsatisfactory
looseness of that view, there was no such development. On
the other hand, it seems to have been felt that the com-
pany's liability was not exclusively contractual: "Inde-
pendent of the promise by the defendant to deliver the mes-
sage when it accepted it for transmission, the law imposes
the duty upon it of transmitting and delivering it with
all reasonable diligence' " T Logically, it would seem that
on such a theory a basis of recovery was established in
every case. To defeat this undesired result, the courts
have fallen into the habit of requiring a strictness in plead-
ing at wbich even Baron Parke might have halted. In
1 rif . T. Co. v. Henderson, 89 Ala. 5io, i8go.
IV. U. T. Co. v. Wilson, 93 Ala. 32, 1881; W'. U. T. Co. v. Cunning-
hai, 99 Ala. 314, 1893. In this latter case punitive damages were al-
lowed, although the action was ex contractu.
If. U. T. Co. v. Ayers, 131 Ala. 391, i9o.
I. U. T. Co. v. Krichbaum, 3 S. 607, z9o2.
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Blount v. W. U. T. Co.,1"8 the complaint of a sendee was
dismissed on the ground that the only injury alleged was
the mental anguish itself. According to the general form
of pleading under the Code, all the facts were set out, and
since the court conceded that the action would have been
sustainable had a cause of action been found, either cx con-
tractu or ex delicto, the dismissal of the complaint certainly
seems to have been based on a very small technicality. "'
In the Krichbaum case, the complaint set up a contractual
rclation between the sendee and the company, and alleged
also a breach of duty. The court held that since the grava-
men of the action was the breach of a duty which existed
independently of any contract, the averment of the exist-
ence of a contract was fatal to the right of recovery." If
this be the effect of the Code, we must needs mourn the
disappearance of those ancient pleaders so skilled in the
intricacies of the common law.
The result of the Alabama cases seems to be that, as in
Tennessee, a cause of action exists ex delicto, and even one
who stands in no contractual relation to the company can
recover for mental anguish, if he can frame a complaint
which will meet the technical requirements of the Code as
construed in Alabama.
Indiana.-The Indiana courts have wavered more than
those of any jurisdiction which we shall have to consider.
The first time that the question of recovery for mental
anguish was presented to them, the obiter dictum was hos-
tile to allowing the recovery; 72 but when a decision on the
subject was necessary, an opposite result was arrived at,
and the recovery was allowed. '7  As in all the cases which
we have considered thus far, the mental anguish was con-
sidered not a cause of action, but an element of damages.
1i26 Ala. io5, r9.
Contra, Milliken v. W. U. T. Co., ixo N. Y. 403, i888.
'"See also P. T. C. Co. v. Ford, 117 Ala. 672, 1898; S. C. i24 Ala.
400, 1900.
" The natural apprehension that mental anguish would not be con-
sidered an element of damage in any case, in view of the attitude of
the Alabama courts, is dispelled by the W. U. T. Co. v. Crocker, 33 S.
45, i9o2, where the sender recovered for mental anguish.
' IV. U. T. Co. v. Hamilton, So Ind. x8, 1875.
TO Reese v. IV. U. T. Co., z23 Ind. 2n, i89O.
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In the Reese case, the plaintiff was the sender, who, of
course, had a right of action cx contraclu. But the court
says, per Berkshire, J., "In failing to promptly deliver the
telegram, the telegraph company negligently fails to per-
form a duty which it "iwes to the sender of the telegram,
and should be held liable for whatever injury follows as the
proximate result of its negligent conduct. It is not a mere
breach of contract, but a failure to perform a duty which
rests upon it as a servant of the people.""7' This state-
ment admits of two interpretations and both have been
given to it. It might be considered as a repetition of the
Tennessee view, that failure to use due care in the delivery
of messages is, in every case, the breach of a public duty.'
7 '
But it may be considered also as standing for a view which
is more clearly brought out in a later case, where the basis
of the rule allowing recovery for mental anguish is as-
serted to be, that "the language of a message gives direct
notice to the telegraph company that the message con-
cerns such event or events as that negligence on the part
of the company is likely to be followed by mental distress.
The telegraph company then has the measure of responsi-
bility, and is held liable for special damages for negli-
gence."" 6 This thought is strikingly similar to that of
Bigelow, discussed before. 7" It places the liability of the
company, not on any ground of public duty, but on a basis
of negligence, i. e., failure to use reasonable care to avoid
the affliction upon another of legal injury. The only in-
jury inflicted is mental anguish, and if, as even the Indiana
cases admit, the infliction of mental anguish be not a cause
of action, it is not a legal injury, and there is no legal duty
to use reasonable care to avoid its infliction upon another.
Indiana had not taken very eagerly to the Texas doc-
trine-even in the appellate courts there had been mur-
murings against its propriety,"" and the first time that the
16 At 3o3.
'W W. U. T. Co. v. Slrateincier, 6 Ind. App. 125, 1892; W. U. T. Co.
v. Todd, i899, 53 N. F_ 194.
.' Per Comstock, C. J., W. U. T. Co. v. Bryant, 17 Ind. App. 7o, at
74, 1897. -
Pages 16 to 22.
TV. U. T. Co. v. Briscoe, 18 Ind. App. 22, 1897.
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supreme court had a chance to consider the Reese case,
the Reese case was overruled with but a weak dissent, and
the old rule of twenty-six years before reverted to."" The
Ferguson case evidently was carefully considered, and
coming, as it does, from a jurisdiction supposed to be com-
mitted irretrievably to the Texas doctrine, it probably will
become the leading exponent of the Northern rule. With
considerable diffidence, we suggest, however, that the ar-
guments in favor of the Texas rule, which the court in the
Ferguson case answered, were not the arguments which
the best-considered advocates of that rule advanced. The
court first asserts that a recovery for mental anguish was
unknown at common law, concluding an examination of
cases of physical injuries, of seduction, libel, etc., with the
assertion, "These classes in which mental anguish is cog-
nizable as incident to a cause of action, complete without
it, at least negatively indicate the common law rule that
mental anguish as the proximate and sole result of a negli-
gent act does not constitute a cause of action." The
court assumes, without discussion, that the addressee of a
message has no cause of action independently of the men-
tal anguish which he suffers."' As we have shown, it is on
this point that argument was necessary--even the sup-
porters of the Texas rule do not claim that mental anguish
standing alone constitutes a cause of action. We scarcely
can doubt but that the right of recovery for mental an-
guish in Indiana is settled definitively in the negative,""1
but leaving aside for later consideration the argurhient ab
inconvcnicntc, there is no reason on the theory of the Fer-
guson case why the sender at least, who certainly has a
cause of action by statufe, independently of the mental
anguish suffered, should not recover for that mental an-
guish as an element of damages. In brief, we submit that
the Ferguson case is no answer at all, at least as to strictly
1" W. U. T. Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64, i90!.
' The same petilio principis was made in Conndly v. W. U. T. Co., 4
Va. Sup. 6, 19o2. Indeed, the only case supporting the Northern rule
which really attacks, and with great cleverness, the true basis of the
Texas rule is Chopman v. IW. U. T. Co., 88 Ga. 763, 1892.
" The Ferguson case was followed in IV. U. T. Co. i. Adams, 63
N. E. 125, i9o2.
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legal considerations, to the Texas rule, if the Texas rule be
taken to establish, not that mental anguish is a cause of
action, but that, a cause of action being estabi'shed, men-
tal anguish is an element of damages.
Kentucky.-The Kentucky courts have adopted the
Texas view of the Texas rule-that mental anguish is an
element of damage where a cause of action is established;
but that a cause of action can only be cx contractu. "If a
telegraph company undertakes to send a message, and it
fails to use ordinary diligence in doing so, it is certainly
liable for some damage, though it may be nominal only. It
has violated its contract, and whenever a party does so, he
is liable at least to some extent. Every infraction of a legal
right causes injury in contemplation of law. The party
being entitled in such a case t o recover something, why
should not injury to the feelings, which is often more in-
jurious than a physical one, enter into the estimate?...
Most of the later cases follow the Chapman case without
much discussion,"" but averyrecent one, although recovery
is refused there because of the remoteness Of the damage,
shows that the theory in that state still is that mental an-
guish is an element of danger only when a cause of action
exists cx contractu.11" There has been much less litigation
of the question in Kentucky than in Texas, and there are
no cases in the former state which have extended the doc-
trine of the beneficiary's right to sue, as has been done in
Texas. Should the courts of Kcntucky, however, regard
the action with as much favor as do those of Texas, we
cannot but feel that an adherence to the necessity of find-
ing a contractual cause of action will lead, sooner or later,
to conclusions not tenable on strict legal principles.
North Carolina.-The early North Carolina cases, like
some of the Indiana cases, based the right of recovery on
Per Holt, J., Chapman v. TV. U. T. Co., 9o Ky. 265, at 270, i89o.
' Davis v. W. U. T. Co., 21 Ky. Law R. 1251, xroo; W. U. T. Co. v.
Fishcr, 21 Ky. Law R. I293, i9oo; Taliafcrro v. I. U. T. Co., 2! Ky.
Law R. ixzo, Igoo; W. U. T. Co. v. Van Clcave, 2 Ky. Law R. 53,
igoo; IV. U. T. Co. v. Matthe-ws, 24 Ky. Law R. 3, i902; W. U. T. Co.
v. Hening, 24 Ky. Law R. 1433, 1903.
" Robinson v. HV. U. T. Co., 24 Ky. Law P. 452, 1902.
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principles of negligence;18 5 a theory which seems to us in-
adequate in the mental anguish cases. But the later ex-
pressions conform more to the Tennessee view, that care-
lessness is a breach of the duty which the public nature of
the telegraph company's employment imposes on it. "A
quasi public corporation exercising extraordinary powers
and receiving enormous profits, solely in consideration of
the performance of its public duties, cannot be permitted
to neglect or evade those duties with practical impu-
nity.""" This, we submit, is a lofty and a proper view;
when the telegraph company through negligence fails to
deliver a message, it is injuring the entire public, and a
recovery against the company for such negligence is an in-
direct benefit to the public, for it is an insistence on the
responsibility of its servant. This is what is in the mind
of the court when it says, in the case last cited, "This lia-
bility on the part of public servants to respond in civil
damages to the injured party is the surest guarantee for
the proper performance of their duties to the public.""'
The subsequent North Carolina cases are of little value,
and the Cashion case stands as the strongest expression of
that court.
Iowa.-Iowa is the last jurisdiction which has adopted
the Texas rule, 88 and it, for one, cannot complain that
allowing the recovery has proven to be the "Pandora Box"
which it was predicted that it would be, 8" for the seven
years which have passed since that box was opened in Iowa
have failed, as far as we have been able to find, to produce
a single mental anguish case to plague the courts. To our
mind, the Mentzer case contains far the clearest and ablest
opinion of all the well-coisidered opinions on the subject.
Judge Deemer commences his argument by showing that
' Young v. W. U. T. Co., io7 N. C. 37o, 8go; Sherrill v. W. U. '.
Co., xI6 N. C. 655, 8.95.
' Per Douglas, J., in Cashion v. W. U. T. Co., 123 N. C. 267, at 272,
i89&
.Bennelt v. IV. U. T. Co., 128 N. C. 1o3, i9ox; Rosser v. TV. U. T.
Co., x3o N. C. 251, 1902; Sporkman v. W. U. T. Co., x.3o N. C. 447, 192;
Meadows v. W. U. T'. Co., 43 S. E. 512, N. C. i9o3.
' Mentzer v. W. U. T. Co., 93 Iowa, 752, 1895.
'U Per Mitchell, J., in Francis v. TV. U. T. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 1894.
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a telegraph company is a public agent; that its duty prop-
erly to fulfill its contract is entirely independent of the con-
tractual obligation itself; and that a party injured by the
company's neglect of its duty may sue either in tort or, in
many cases, in contract. He then points out that the Code
having abolished procedural differences between actions-in
contract and those in tort, a plaintiff should recover what-
ever damages could be had in either form of action. We
cannot forbear to quote part of the beautifully clear-cut
statement which follows, of the difference in the measure
of damages in tort and in contract. After stating the rule
in Hadley v. Baxendale, which governs the measure of dam-
ages in contract, the court proceeds: "In actions for tort,
the rule is much broader. The universal and cardinal prin-
ciple in such cases is that the person injured shall receive
compensation commensurate with his loss, or injury, and
no more. . . . These damages are not limited or af-
fected, so far as they are compensatory, by what was in
fact contemplated by the party in fault. He who is re-
sponsible for a negligent act must answer for all the injuri-
ous results which flow therefrom by 'rdinary natural se-
quence, without the interposition of any other negligent
act or overpowering force. Whether the injurious conse-
quences may have been reasonably expected to follow from
the commission of the act is not at all determinative of
the liability of the person who committed the act to
respond to the person suffering therefrom. As was said
in Stevens v. Dudley, 56 Vt. i58, 'it is the unexpected,
rather than the expected, that happens in a great majority
of cases of negligence.' "
Having established that the company's negligence
creates a cause of action, either in contract or in tort, and
second, that the mental anguish is both a reasonably to-be-
expected consequence under Hadley v. Baxendale, and a
natural and not too remote result under the test in tort,
the court proceeds to the third inquiry-whether mental
anguish is an admissible element of damages, either in con-
tract or in tort. The conclusion reached is affirmative in both
cases, and strongly as we may be convinced, before reading
" At 76o.
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the opinion, that mental anguish is not an element of dam-
ages in actions for breach of contract, we can keep our-
selves from concurring in the court's opinion that it should
be, only by holding fast to the knc'vledge that although,
as has been said, "mental anguish antedated the begin-
nings of the common law,"2 ' it never has been considered
an element of damages in contractual actions by any of
those great judges who planted and tended in its youth
the great tree of our system of jurisprudence. But the
court is not hampered in this way when it comes to the
question of the admissibility of mental anguish as an ele-
ment of damages in tort actions, and we must say that it
seems to us, as it seemed to the Iowa court, that "when it
is conceded that mental suffering may be compensated for
in actions of tort, the right of the plaintiff to recovei" in this
case is established."
The ratio decidcndi, in brief, was this--omitting what
was said as to the contractual nature of the action: First,
the negligence of a telegraph company is the breach of
a public duty, for which it is liable "to any person injured
thereby for all the damages which he may sustain"; second,
mental anguish resulting from negligence in the delivery
of a death message is a natural and not too remote conse-
quence of the breach of duty; third, mental anguish is a
species of injury recoverable for, when the natural and
proximate consequence of an existing cause of action in
tort. This is putting the Texas rule on a much sounder
basis than the Texas courts have put it, and represents
perhaps the strongest possible argument in favor of the
right of recovery for mental anguish.
Those jurisdictions which have adopted what we have
called the Northern rule have been much more consistent in
the reasoning upon which their decisions have been based
than have been the supporters of the Texas rule. Their
arguments have been that recovery for mental anguish is,
from a legal standpoint, an innovation, and that it is, from
a practical standpoint, an undesirable innovation. We
have been considering the former position up to this point,
and have endeavored to show that we are by no means
. Per Baker, J., in Ferguson v. W. U. T. Co., 157 Ind. 64, 65, xgor.
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without precedent in regarding mental anguish as an ele-
ment of damages at common law.
Ve propose now to consider the practical objections
which have been made to the Texas rule. It has been sug-
gested as an interesting speculation, whether all law did
not come originally from public policy,""2 and when we
remember that law is merely the expression of a commu-
nity's sense of right, and that "right is nothing else but
whatever reason certainly acknowledges as a sure and con-
cise means of obtaining happiness,'' we cannot doubt but
that the practical considerations, "to which the traditions
of the bench would hardly have tolerated a reference fifty
years ago," ' are entitled to great weight in the deter-
mination of this subject. One can sympathize thoroughly
with Canty, J., when he said, "Mere logic will not dispose
of a question of this character. The court must keep one
eye on the theoretical and the other on the practical." '
If, however, we have been fortunate enough to establish
the proposition that mental anguish is at common law an
usual element of compensation in tort actions, it seems
but fair that those who favor making an exception in the
telegraph cases should assume the burden of showing the
inadvisability of allowing recovery. The two practical
objections which have beefi urged are, first, the impolicy
of opening so immense a field of litigation, and second, the
futility and consequent absurdity of attempting to nieas-
ure, in money, injury which, from its very nature, is invis-
ible, intangible, unascertainable.
When we consider statistics-and this we must do, to.
answer the uniformly made and, strangely enough, never
disputed argument, that to allow recovery in these mental
anguish cases would foster an "intolerable and intermi-
nable litigation, beyond the reach of ordinary imagina-
x Bausman, io Wash. Bar Ass'n Rep. 143, i898.
"' Burlamaqul, Natural and Political Law (7th ed.), 37.
Holmes, Common Law, 78.
Francis v. TV. U. T. Co., 58 'Minn. 252, at 267, 1897. "For the
rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the
present, but the man of the future is the man of economics and the
master of statistics": Judge Holmes. The Path of the Law; a striking
sentence from a striking lawyer. io Harv. Law Rev. 457, at 469, 1897.
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tion'"'-we cannot but feel how much more fearful than
fact is fancy. We cannot wonder that court after court
has rejected the Texas rule, when it reads and believes such
statements as this: "If suits at law for damages were per-
mitted for mental suffering only, all the courts of the
Union would speedily find themselves in the plight of the
Texas tribunals, wherein a large percentage of the total
litigation consists of actions against telegraph companies
for negligence in delivering dispatches, the only alleged
damage being subjective and very frequently entirely im-
aginary.""0' With this assertion in mind, it is interesting
to see how large a percentage of the cases in Texas re-
ported in the official series of rcports of that state during
1899 and 19oo were mental anguish cases. In the supreme
court, out of the one hundred and ten cases which came
up in 1899, not a single one involved the question which
we have been considering, and out of the one hundred and
twenty which arose in 19oo, a solitary one represented this
litigious branch of Texas jurisprudence. In the courts of
civil appeals, the four hundred cases contained four de-.
cisions on the recovery for mental anguish in 1899, and the
same number in i9oo. Of ten hundred and thirty cases, just
nihc incntal anguish cases-less than I per cent. In the face
of such facts, one scarcely can hear without impatience the
customary warning against the "intolerable litigation" ''
which is said necessarily to follow the adoption of the
Texas rule.
The Ferguson case,' adopting the linc of argument in
the Rogers case, " ' has attempted to show that certain
positions considered by the supporters of the Northern
rule entirely inconsistent hiave been assumed by the Texas
courts as the result of a wild effort to restrain the volume
of litigation consequent on the adoption of the Texas rule.
Some of the positions we believe to be not at all irrecon-
cilable, and others, if undistinguishable in principle, are
different in facts. Of the latter kind, the majority are
Per Hughes, J., Peay v. W. U. T. Co., 64 Ark. 538, at 545, 1898.
N. Y. Law Journal, August, i9o2.
TM Moton v. WV. U. T. CO., 53 Ohio St. 431, 1895.
ile 157 Ind. 64, I90. '68 Miss. 748, i89r.
776
LIABILITY OF TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.
traceable, in our opinion, to the Texas view of the Texas
rule, viz., that a cause of action cx contractu is necessary to
maintain the action. Hence the decisions before com-
mented on,2"1 as to the party benefited by the contract;
hence the decisions as to the presumption of mental
anguish in case of blood relationship only; 2 hence the de-
cisions as to what language does give notice to the com-
pany of the importance of the message and what does not.
If the cause of action be ex delicto, and the test of rea-
sonably foreseeable injury be replaced by that of naturally
consequent injury, most at least of these apparent contra-
dictions would vanish. Of those positions which we believe
to be not irreconcilable, the most striking is the much-de-
rided distinction in Rowell v. W. U. T. Co.,203 "between the
negligence of failing to deliver a dispatch which causes
mental pain and suffering, and failing to deliver one which,
if delivered, would relieve such suffering."'" When a com-
pany fails to deliver a dispatch announcing, for instance,
the death of the addressee's father, for what mental an-
guish does the addressee recover? Of course, not for the
grief at the fact of his father's death-the telegraph corn-
pany was not responsible for tliat, -' nor for his disappoint-
iiient at not receiving news of his father's death earlier-it
might be questioned whether that, standing alone, would
not be rather a relief. "The alleged actionable wrong is in
depriving the plaintiff of the opportunity of attending the
funeral,"20' 8 as is proven by the fact that there can be no
recovery if the evidence show either that the plaintiff
would not have gone to the funeral even if he had received
the message, °.0 or that he could not have reached the place
:o Pages 83 to 8r.
Cashion v. W17. U. T. Co., z23 N. C. 267, i898; W. U. T. Co. v.
Coffin, 88 Tex. 94, 1895; IV. U. T. Co. v. Steenbergen, 2! Ky. Law R.
12,,9, 1900.
75 Tex. 26, 1889. At 759.
So Rclle v. W. U. T. Co., 55 Tex. 3o8, 1881; Rosser v. IV. U. T. Co.,
13o N. C. 251, 3902.
' IV. U. T. Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64, 7x, i9oi; W. U. T. Co. v.
Simmons, 75 S. W. 822, Tex. i903.
IV. U. T. Co. v. Johnson, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 546. 1897; If. U. T. Co.
v. Stccnbcrgcn, 21 Ky. Law R. 1289, 9oo: fV. U. T. Co. v. Parsons, 72
S. W. 8oo. Ky. i9o3; Bright v. W. U. T. Co., 43 S. E. 84!, N. C. I9o3.
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of the funeral before it was over,2 8 or that he failed to do
so because of his own negligence."' In other words, what
the addressee recovers for, is not his mental anguish at not
receiving the intelligence contained in the message, but his
mental anguish at being unable to do what the prompt re-
ceipt of that intelligence would have enabled him to do.
In a case where the message in question is:-
"Sam is better ' '"- -
it is evident that the only mental anguish suffered from the
non-deliveryof the message is the failuretoreceivetheintel-
ligence contained in it. 2 11  It may be said that the distinc-
tion is unsubstantial, and that recovery should be allowed
even though the only mental anguish ensuing the com-
pany's negligence be from the non-receipt of the intelli-
gence contained in the message. This, it must be ad-
mitted, is a reasonable contention, but we suggest that the
rule has not been adopted in such breadth, for the reason
hinted at above-that ignorance of a sad event might be
considered by many people bliss. That is, the recovery is
denied, not because of any inherent quality of the mental
anguish, but because of the uncertainty of its existence; it
is considered as, and excluded like, any other speculative or
imaginary element of damage."'
We believe, then, that the fear of a great increase in the
magnitude of litigation, as a consequence of the adoption
of the Texas rule, is unfounded; but it does seem strange
to us that the probability of this anticipated increase has
never been regarded as an argument in favor of the Texas
rule. In theory, at least, every time that a plaintiff recov-
ers, his success is predicated of a previous status obnoxious
to the law, and restores that equipoise of right and wrong
Cumberland Tel. Co. v. Brown, 1o4 Tenn. 56, 1900.
Wt7. U. T. Co. v. Bryson, 61 S. 1. 548, Tex. igoi; TV. U. T. Co. v.
Sorsby, 69 S. W. x22, Tex. z9o2.
"McCarthy v. W. U. T. Co., 56 S. W. 568, Tex. i9oo.
" It is suggested in TV. U. T. Co. v. Cavin, 70 S. W. 229, 1902, that
recovery was denied in the Rowell case because the damage was too
remote; but this position seems to us unsustainable.
"McA4len v. 1U'. U. T. Co., 7o Tex. 243, i888; Morrison v. IV. U. T.
Co., 24 Tex. Civ. App. 347, 1900. So, if it be shown that inability to
attend a funeral caused a plaintiff relief, rather than pin. he could not
recover at all: IV. U. T. Co. v. Sihmonls, 75 S. W. 822, Tex. x9o3.
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which we call justice. When the law refuses to bring about
this condition, there is created a state of affairs which we
euphemistically term damnum absque injuria-i. e., true, an
individual has been injured, but we cannot relieve him. To
justify a stand apparently so unjustifiable, we believe that
but one cause can be assigned, viz., that if this act of jus-
tice to the injured individual were performed, a dispropor-
tionately great injustice would be done to the community;
the endurance of injustice is, under the circumstances, the
price of the social status." ' It is conceived that the legiti-
mate operation of the principle damnnt absque injuria is
confined to four classes of cases: First, where it is equiva-
lent to the maxim de miniis non curat k¢x-as where the
court refuses to consider failure to award nominal dam-
ages reversible error, or where it sustains a demurrer to
an action so trivial that the court considers the considera-
tion of the action beneath its dignity;... second, where one
of two persons possessing equal rights has attempted, by
acting on his right before the other similarly exercised his,
to prevent the latter from exercising his right to the same
degree as he has done already-as where an owner of land
builds upon it and demands that his neighbor furnish
lateral support for his house, or where a man who has goni
into one line of business wishes to enjoin another from
competing with him; third, where the legislature has au-
thorized the infliction of a certain injury by one on an-
other, and the latter is without redress for this exercise of
the right of the sovereign to take the property of its sub-
ject; and fourth, -where, in the interests of the common
safety, the injuring of one man's property is requisite. But
except in these cases, we believe that every decision is to
be approved which lessens this "imperfect coincidence be-
tween the sphere of things hurtful in fact and hurtful in
law." ' It is, pro tanto, a remedy for a legal disease there-
tofore believed incurable. It is a step towards \vhat must
be the ideal of any civilized system of law-that a remedy
'" Of course, too, as member of the community, he is benefited at
the same time.
"'Story, Equity Pleadings, Sec. Soo.
"' Salmond, Jurisprudence, i6o.
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should be furnished for every wrong, using the latter term
in its broadest sense.
None of the four exceptions above stated would bring
within this grotto dcl cane of the common law the action
for damages for mental anguish, and as far as the mere
number of cases in which, under the Texas rule, a plaintiff
would be relieved goes, we feel that the argument is in
favor of the Texas rule. For, it 'Must be remembered that
"if the rule open a vast and fruitful field of litigation, it is
only because telegraph companies fail to do their duty.)
2 1
As a matter of fact, very little hardship is imposed on the
telegraph companies by requiring them to deliver mes-
sages promptly and properly. Except under unusual cir-
cumstances, there is no reason why messages should not
be transmitted with perfect accuracy, and even less why
they should not be delivered with reasonable punctuality.
We cannot but exclaim, when we read opinions in which
the liability to error, by reason of the necessary infirmity
of telegraph apparatus, is made the excuse for freeing the
company of the duty to be careful, "Is it an infant yet in its
swaddling clothes? No, but a giant power, under the con-
trol of man, whose daily exploits, guided by his care and
skill, throw those of the fabled Mercury deep into shade.
2 1
In short, we believe that even did the adoption of the
Texas rule cause a much greater increase in the amount of
litigation than it really does, no principle of public policy
requires or justifies even its rejection on that ground alone.
A much stronger argument against the adoption of the
rule is found in the nature of the injury itself: it "soars so
exclusively within the realms of spirit land that it is oe-
yond the reach of courts to-deal with, or to compensate by
any of the known standards of value,"2 8 say those who
reject the rule. It is, perhaps, not useless to notice at the
outset two considerations which even aggravate this diffi-
"6 Mentcer v. IV. U. T. Co., 93 Iowa, 752, at 77s, 1895.
"' Per Breese, J., in IV. U. T. Co. v. Tyler, 74 Ill. 168, at I7O, 1874;
and see Reed v. I+. U. T. Co., 135 Mo. 661, 1896.
.. Per Taylor, J., in . 0. T. Co. v. Saunders, 32 Fla. 434, 1893; and
see Lurton, J., dissenting in IVadsworth v. IV. U. T. Co.. 86 Tenn. 695,
1888; Curtin v. H. U. T. Co.. 13 App. Div. 253, N. Y. 1897; Hamilton,
Liability of Telegraph Companies, 53 Cent. Law, J. 6, igoz.
LIABILITY OF TELEGRAI'H COMPANIES. 76I
culty of giving a just compensation: First, whenever aplain-
tiff has been wronged by a rich corporation, the danger
that the jury will not remember that damages for mental
anguish are purely compensatory,"1 and will inflict an un-
warrantably high verdict as a punishment, is as great as it
is irremediable. " ' The second consideration is one which
handicaps the plaintiff. He sues-and we quote this edi-
torial from our daily press as representing the general feel-
ing-"More for the purpose of imposing a penalty upon
the company for negligence than for the mere hope of hav-
ing a financial reward and making money out of the calam-
ity."221 Or, as a plaintiff less elegantly told the jury in a
late Texas case, "I wanted to spite the company, and get
every cent out of them I could. It was not because I cared
for the money.12 22  It is easy to see that, as a practical
matter, a man who admitted to the jury that he was suing
to obtain a profit from his relative's death would make a
very small profit indeed. But the plaintiff in the Bell case
was defeated by the court through the very language
which was necessary to save him before the jury: "For
anger and resentment toward defendant," said the court,
"there can be no recovery." The recovery is, in theory,
limited to compensation, to the quantity of coin equal to
the mental anguish of the plaintiff. At first it seems
absolutely impossible to think of the one in terms of the
other; it was said eighty years ago, "there is no standard
by which the price of affection can be adjusted, and no
scale to graduate the feelings of the heart." 23  But, un-
daunted by these apparently insurmountable obstacles, let
us consider the problem a little further.
The first question which naturally suggests itself is, can
we not fix an arbitrary limit to the amount of recovery?"2'
Certainly such a limitation could come only from the legis-
"' Stuart v. W. U. T. Co., 66 Tex. 58o, 1886; I. 0. T. Co. v. Saundcri,
32 Fla. 43, 1893; Cashion v. IV. U. T. Co.. 123 N. C. 267, 3898.
W. U. T. Co. v. IJ'omack, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 6o7, 1895.
Utica Press, August 6, i9o2.
TV. U. T. Co. v. Be!!, 61 S. W. w4, Igor.
Per Taylor, C. J., in Francis v. Howard, 3 Murph,, 74, 8o, N. C.
1819.
-' Advocated by Canty, J., in Francis v. W1. U. T. Co., 58 Minn. 252,
at 267. 1894.
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lature. In those states whose constitutions forbid any
limitation for damages in personal actions for negli-
gence,2-5 such legislation would be impossible. In other
states it would be possible if not otherwise unconstitu-
tional. The question of its constitutionality would involve
two considerations: First, could a legislature provide that
mental anguish should be an element of damages only in
telegraph cases, or would this be a taking of the telegraph
company's property without due process of law; and sec-
ond, if the statute be constitutional in allowing damages
in such cases, can their amount be limited? The first ques-
tion has been answered in the affirmative by the Supreme
Court of South Carolina, upholding in a most able opinion
the "mental anguish" act of 19oi.'" The second question
seems scarcely doubtful in view of the numerous acts limit-
ing liability for injuries caused by negligence, in states whose
constitutions do not forbid such limitations. " ' There are,
to our mind, very many arguments in favor of such a limi-
tation, and we feel that the possibility of providing so ade-
quate a remedy for the much-complained-of unascertain-
ability of the amount of recovery should be a controlling
consideration -in those jurisdictions which have refused to
adopt the Texas rule because the damages are "too vague,
shadowy and uncertain.
222 S
Personally, however, we do not believe that such a
statute is necessary. The difficulty of estimating a money
equivalent for anything diminishes as we exchange the
article for the money. We sell horses often; and so, we
have comparatively little difficulty in estimating the pecu-
niary value of a horse. We do not sell our feelings; and
so, we have great difficulty in calculating their worth in
currency; but moralizing aside, this difficulty is sim-
ply because we are not accustomed to think of feelings
in terms of money. Of course, in the case of a horse,
there is a common denominator between the money and
'Arkansas, Art. 5. Sec. 32; Kentucky, Art. S, Sec. 54; Penna.,
Art. 3, Sec. 21; Wyoming, Art. to, Sec. 4; New York, Art. x, Sec. 18
(only as to injuries resulting in death).
Simmons v. W1,. U. T. Co., 63 S. C. 425, 19o2
Collected in Southern LaW Rev. N. S. 7o3.
Per Mr. Justice Pope, in Lewis v. IV. U. 7. Co., 57 S. C. 325, 1900.
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the horse, viz., the average desire for each; whereas, in the
case of mental anguish, the demand and the supply, so to
speak, are centred in the same individual. It is necessary,
then, to admit that a demonstrably exact money equiva-
lent for mental anguish cannot be found. 29  But the law
does not require that; what it wants is a sum of money
which it is fair that the defendant should pay to the plain-
tiff. 23" In cases of personal injury, we are familiar with the
expedient of resorting to a comparison of verdicts in simi-
lar cases, to determine the reasonableness of the verdict in
a particular case. It may be objected that this is not scien-
tific, but it cannot be said that, like the "stop, look and
listen" rule, it does not tend to reduce to a convenient
certainty that which before was most inconveniently un-
certain. In a late Missouri case, the court arrived at what
it considered a reasonable verdict by tabulating verdicts in
other decisions, and comparing their amounts with that of
the verdict under consideration. 1' We have collected in
the same way the cases which we have been able to find, in
Texas, where there was a recovery for the mental anguish
consequent on inability to attend a relative's funeral. It
may be that such a table is worse than useless, that it is a
forbidden use of that res inter alios acta, so strenuously
excluded in other cases, that the sum which would com-
pensate one plaintiff is absolutely no criterion of what is
a fair compensation to another plaintiff. On the other
hand, it may be that, as a practical matter, such a list is
some evidence, at least, of what is a. fair and reasonable
verdict;' at any rate, it is not uninteresting to note the
striking evenness of the amounts recovered.
=Most profoundly true was that remark of Dunbar, J., in Gray v.
later Pouer Co., 7x Pac. 2o6, Wash. 1903, "There is an element of sen-
timent in all damages---even in the possession and use of money it-
self-for a given amount of money may be of far more value to one
person than to another." In this world, it is to be feared, exact
equivalents cannot be found, in the matter of compensation.
Goodhart v. R. R., 177 Pa. x, 896, at 14, IS.
:tClitty v. Py., 6.s S. W. 959, 19oi.
- The first judicial indication of a tendency to adopt such a course
appeared in these significant words of 117. U. T. Co. v. Cross. 74 S. W.
IoS. Ky. 1903: "The verdict rendered, as comnpared with verdicts usually
o:.arded by juries in such cases, cannot be considered excessive."
(Italics ours.)
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Parent ......... .... $1475......W. U. T. Co. v. Beringer ...... P4 Tex. 8,t 1892.
Parent ................... 675 . W  U. T. Co. v. Cooper ........ 69 S. W. 427,1902.
Parent ................... 400 W  IT. T. Co. v. Johusou ....... 9 Civ. App. 48,1694.
Brother or Siter.... 1000...... W u. Co. v. Rtasentreter. 80 T,.x 406, 191.
Brother or Sister... 750 . W. U. T. Co. v. Carter .......... 24 Civ. App 0. 1900.
]rother or sister...7....... U. T. Co. v. Thlmpsou....18 Civ. App 279. 18M.
Brother or Sister.... W) ...... W. U. T. Co. v. Ward .......... 19 S  WV. b9, 1892.
Brotler or Sister-... 500 . W. U. T. Co. v. Hill ............. 2 S. W. 2,2, 1894.
Brother or Sister ... 40). W. U. T. Co. v. Johnson ....... 16 Clv. %pp. 516. 187.
Child ..................... 75. W  U. T. Co. v. Kiuslev ....... 8 Civ. App. 527.114.
Child ................... 750 .... W  U. T. Co. v. Rice...: ......... 61 S  W .. 19Jl.
Child .................... 450 ... W  U. T. Co. v. Guest .......... 3 S W. 281,29 5.
Child ..................... 400 . W. U. T. Co. v. Waller ........ 47 S W. 396 1898.
Child ................. 350 .....W.U. T. Co. v. Davis ........... 71 S  W. 313,192.
Again, we admit, as needs we must, that although we
find that the average recovery in these fourteen cases was
$65o, there can be no way of establishing, that that sum
rather than $6,5oo or $65,ooo represents the money value
of the anguish suffered in those cases. We can recognize
that $65 would be too small a verdict, but how can we say
what would be too large a verdict: "Appellee testified that
he was very much disappointed and grieved at not being
able to be present at the funeral of his sister; that he
would not have missed it for anything in the world."2 " If
we admit that a comparison of verdicts is permissible, how-
ever, our difficulty is almost solved. As time goes on and
verdicts multiply there will be as much uniformity in the
verdicts in these mental anguish cases as though their
amounts were fixed by statutes; and certainly the injustice
of thus compensating in an equal amount those who may
have suffered most unequal wrong is as little in the former
as in the latter case.
But granting that all this is entirely irrelevant, and that
we must determine without any guide the propriety of a
verdict, still it must be admitted that an equal difficulty
exists in any case where compensation is given for men-
tal anguish. What common denominator can be found
for a father's feeling of shame at his daughter's dis-
honor and gold or silver, which will not be equally a com-
mon denominator for a father's feeling of grief at not see-
ing the dead body of his daughter and gold or silver? The
common law may have furnished no "formula for trans-
' IV. U. T. Co. v. Rose'treter, So Tex. 4o6, 1891.
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muting a psychical condition into gold," '' but Missouri,
which rejects the Texas rule because of the impossibility of
ascertaining damages, " ' finds no difficulty in allowing a re-
covery for the mental anguish which, for years after the trial
is ended, a plaintiff is said to be likely to suffer as the re-
sult of a physical injury."'8 The same is true in the Federal
courts,23 in Wisconsin... and in many other jurisdictions.
Pennsylvania, which rejects the Texas rule because of the
impossibility of ascertaining the damages, finds no diffi-
culty in allowing the representatives of one now dead to re-
cover compensation for the mental anguish which the suf-
ferer, now far beyond the jurisdiction of any temporal
court, Iad endured up to the time of his death. '9  Upon
what basis are these damages assessed?..0
Let us leave aside even this consideration. The ques-
tion arises, shall we, because it is impossible accurately,
or perhaps even adequately, to compensate a plaintiff for
what he has suffered, refuse him all compensation? Under
the Anglo-Saxon law, a price was set upon a man accord-
ing to his rank in life, and if he were killed-homicide being
then largely a civil affair-the amount of this wcr was paid
to his relatives. "" This seems to us a heartless mode of
proceeding, but was it less kind than that later develop-
ment of the law which led Lord Ellenborough to make the
famous statement, "The death of a human being cannot be
complained of as an injury"- 2 ? We are not accustomed to
think any longer that because "there is no mode of esti-
mating 'compensation' for the death of a man," ' recovery
in such cases should be denied.2 " Will it not seem to a
generation to come equally illogical to admit that, al-
Per Baker, J., in IV. U. T. Co. v. Fcrguson, 157 Ind. 64, 69, 19o.
Connell v. 1If. U. T. Co.. 1o8 Mo. 459, 1892.
Snjilcy v. R. R., i6o Mo. 6-9, 19Oi.
'Dc,cr Ry. v. Roller, oo Fed. 738, 19oo.
Ycrkes v. R. R., 112 Wis. 184, i9o.
SMahcr v. Traction Co., i81 Pa. 391, 1897.
-'0 See 7 Va. Law Reg. 717, 1902.
.. Stevens. list. Criminal Law, Vol. I, page 57.
'In Baker v. Bolton, I Camp. 493, I8o&
'" Per Knowlton, J., in Ramsdell v. New York, etc., R. R., 151 Mass.
245, 249, 1890. " Pollock, Torts (3d ed, English), 58.
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though mental anguish is undoubted injury, yet "mental
pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend
to redress" 4 ? We are accustomed to think that if a man
agrees to do something and cannot do everything that he
agreed to do, yet, at the suit of the other party, he will be
compelled to do as much as he can, or to pay damages for
not fulfilling his contract; and it is difficult to see why a
similarprinciple should not be applied to these cases. Aver-
dict is not like the answer to a geometrical problem, whose
correct solution can be determined. It is the collective
opinion of twelve average men as to a matter which is
incapable of demonstrably correct solution. When that
which was a question of opinion becomes a question of
fact, we say, paradoxically enough, that it becomes a ques-
tion of law; by which we mean a question of fact decided by
the court. To send a question to a jury presupposes,
therefore, that two views are possible, and it is merely a
difference in degree whether the doubtful question of fact
be the opinion as to negligence or the opinion as to a
proper compensation for mental anguish. In neither case
is the verdict ascertainably right. We have not reached
yet the indefinitely broad conception of the civil law, that
"in cases of the unlawful deprivation of some legitimate
gratification, although the same are not appreciated in
money, yet damages are due" ,-' still, few common law
judges would take the stand consciously, we suppose, that
where exact compensation is impossible, no attempt to
compensate shall be made.
Deeply convinced are we that the considerations of pub-
lic policy urged against the adoption of the Texas rule are
based, not on a condition which is, but on a condition
which is imagined, and which, like most fancied evils, is
more fearful than the actual evils are. If this be true, and
if it be true that, in general, mental anguish is, at com-
mon law, an element of damage, where a cause of action in
tort is established, we submit that the Northern rule con-
Per Lord Vensleydale, in Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. C. 577, at 598,
i861.
2" R. C. C. Louisiana, 1934. See Tissot v. Tel. Co., 39 La. Ann. 996,
at 1005, 1887; Lewis v. Hones, 34 S. 66, La. 1903 (recovery allowed
bride for disappointment due to poor fit of wedding gown).
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stitutes an indefensible exception to the common law doc-
trine. Not only is it negatively not good, but it is posi-
tively bad, in that it enlarges the field of danznum absquc
injiria, and by destroying the liability, destroys the re-
sponsibility, and consequently the efficiency of a great pub-
lic utility."7
It has been pointed out that the English language, un-
like the French or the German, has different words to ex-
press "right" and "law." Let us hope that the diversity is
verbal only, and that in fact right is equivalent to law.
The object of this paper has been to suggest that the
best basis upon which to lay the foundation for a telegraph
company's liability consists in the publit nature of its
employment; and that, so laid, recovery can be had, ac-
cording to the ordinary measure of damages in delictual
actions, in every case in which a message is sent and care-
lessly handled, whether the message be open or cipher, and
whether the natural and not too remote consequences of
its non-delivery or of its late or inaccurate delivery be
pecuniary or sentimental injury. We do not flatter our-
selves that these suggestions have not been made already,
with much greater force than our humble ability has per-
mitted us to present them, but we shall feel that our effort
has not been in vain if we have succeeded in no more than
calling attention to these thoughts of others.
Morris Wolf.
""' Cashion v. It. U. T. Co., 123 N. C. 267, at 272, ig8.
